American Philosophical Quarterly

Papers
(The median citation count of American Philosophical Quarterly is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-06-01 to 2025-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
American Philosophical Quarterly35
Corroboration9
Thomson 50 Years Later8
Methodological Naturalism Undercuts Ontological Naturalism6
Collateral Legal Consequences and Criminal Sentencing6
Mob Rules: Toward a Causal Model of Social Structure5
Eliciting and Assessing our Moral Risk Preferences4
IS ANTI-THEISM INCOHERENT?4
RECENT WORK IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING4
Introduction, Summary, Questions for the Future3
Gratitude for (One's Own) Life3
Just Judge3
Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Concepts3
Introduction to the Special Issue: Racism3
What Does it Mean to Say “The Criminal Justice System is Racist”?3
The Subjective Ought and the Accessibility of Moral Truths3
Modal Collapse and Modal Fallacies: No Easy Defense of Simplicity3
Epistemic Idolatry and Intellectual Vice3
Intellectual Virtue Signaling3
Closed-minded Belief and Indoctrination2
Healthcare Resource Allocation, Machine Learning, and Distributive Justice2
Against an Argument for Objective Probabilities of Undetermined Choices2
Allowing and the Failure to Act2
Structural Racism Within Reason2
Living in the Moment is for Oysters2
American Philosophical Quarterly2
IMPOSSIBLE INTENTIONS2
Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge2
Sufficient Conditions for Counterfactual Transitivity and Antecedent Strengthening1
Smoke Machines1
Does the Direct Argument Beg the Question?1
Is Discrimination Harmful?1
Making a Murderer1
Justification Without Excuses1
The Contact Argument: A Little Unduly Simple?1
How the Block Grows1
Hate, Identification, and Othering1
KNOWING ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY1
Reasons to Respond to AI Emotional Expressions1
What is a Naturalized Principle of Composition?1
Value Alignment for Advanced Artificial Judicial Intelligence1
Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief1
A Flexible, Sloppy Blob?1
The Paradox of Self-Blame1
Algorithmic Recommender Systems1
Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology1
Should Algorithms that Predict Recidivism Have Access to Race?1
Belief in Character Studies1
The Anti-Conceptual Engineering Argument and the Problem of Implementation1
A Problem for Immanent Universals in States of Affairs1
No Wellbeing for Robots (and Hence no Rights)1
Rethinking The Replacement of Physicians with AI0
Automated Influence and Value Collapse0
Third-Party Apologies; Theory and Form0
Introduction to the Special Issues0
What is AI Ethics?0
An Intellectualist Dilemma0
How Much Do We Discount Past Pleasures?0
Does Hope Require Belief?0
THE (VIRTUE) EPISTEMOLOGY OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE0
Towards a Conversational Ethics of Large Language Models0
Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety0
Testimonial Injustice and the Ideology Which Produces It0
UPLOADS, FAXES, AND YOU0
Trial by Design0
Postsemantic Peirceanism0
Dispensing with Facts, Substances, and Structures0
Metaphysical Foundationalism: Consensus and Controversy0
CAUSAL BLAME0
Reasons, Weight, and Hybrid Approaches to the Metaphysics of Practical Normativity0
Perfectionist Preferentism0
Epistemic Partialism and Taking Our Friends Seriously0
PARTS OF SPACETIME0
Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat0
A Capability Approach to AI Ethics0
Multi-Value Alignment for Ml/Ai Development Choices0
The Four Fundamental Components for Intelligibility and Interpretability in AI Ethics0
Moral Responsibility Must Look Back0
Binary Properties as the Basis of Equality0
On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom in Different Ways0
An Afro-Communitarian Relational Theory of AI'S Moral Status0
“Epistemic Frankfurt Cases” Against the Backdrop of the Original Frankfurt Case0
Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief0
Reasons as Reasons for Preferences0
BOREDOM, HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY, AND IMMORTALITY0
Anti-Asian Racism0
AGAINST THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND INTENTIONS FOR THE PRESENT0
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 58 (2021)0
Interthematic Polarization0
Agentive Modals and Agentive Modality0
THE STANDARD OF CORRECTNESS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF DEPICTION0
Are Phenomenal Theories of Thought Chauvinistic?0
Why Causation is Biconditional but not Proportional0
Virtue Ethics in Social Theory0
Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem?0
Race and Class Together0
Generative Artificial Intelligence and Authorship Gaps0
The Nature and Norms of Vigilance0
Introduction0
INFORMATION, COGNITION, AND OBJECTIVITY0
Last Chance Saloons for Natural Kind Realism0
Is Racism Essentially Systemic?0
Naturalism and the Question of Ontology0
On Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Belief-Formation Methods0
Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist0
Metaphysics as Essentially Imaginative and Aiming at Understanding0
MELLOR’S QUESTION0
“Go Back to Where You Came From!”0
Towards A Skillful-Expert Model for Virtuous Machines0
Responsibly Engineering Control0
Systematicity and Skepticism0
INCOMPARABILITY AND THE HUGE-IMPROVEMENT ARGUMENTS0
American Philosophical Quarterly0
Against and For Ethical Naturalism0
Liking that It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain's Unpleasantness0
Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent Concept0
The Phenomenology of Hope0
Evidence and Emotions0
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