Journal of Economic Theory

Papers
(The median citation count of Journal of Economic Theory is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-06-01 to 2026-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution44
Maxmin expected utility in Savage's framework24
Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations22
A microfounded approach to currency substitution and government policy21
Tor-Periphery Insider Networks20
Corrigendum to “Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions” [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 127–164]17
Bargaining under almost complete information16
Sequential Bayesian persuasion15
Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games14
Search theory of imperfect competition with decreasing returns to scale14
A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations14
Editorial Board13
Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment13
The evolution of resilience13
Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining13
Segmentation and beliefs: A theory of self-fulfilling idiosyncratic risk12
Perverse ethical concerns: Misinformation and coordination12
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment11
Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests11
Editorial Board11
Strength of preference over complementary pairs axiomatizes alpha-MEU preferences11
Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation11
Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence11
Delegated recruitment and statistical discrimination11
Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule11
The multiple-volunteers principle11
Panics and prices10
Meritocracy versus diversity10
A choice-functional characterization of welfarism10
Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129]10
Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity10
Understanding uncertainty shocks and the role of black swans9
Motivated naivete9
Optimal monetary policy in production networks with distortions9
Information design for social learning on a recommendation platform9
Bad reputation due to incompetent expert9
Editorial Board9
Random utility models with ordered types and domains9
The A/B testing problem with Gaussian priors9
The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game9
Editorial Board9
Incomplete financial markets, the social cost of carbon and constrained efficient carbon pricing9
Corrigendum to “Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models” [J. Econ. Theory 195 (2021) 105260]9
Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators9
Integrability and identification in multinomial choice models8
Irreversible investment under predictable growth: Why land stays vacant when housing demand is booming8
Optimal banking with delegated monitoring8
Fiscal stimulus with imperfect expectations: Spending vs. tax policy8
Strategic investment and learning with private information8
Personal power dynamics in bargaining8
Monopoly pricing with optimal information8
Collective decision through an informed mediator8
Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts7
Corrigendum to “Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule” [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308–318]7
Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems7
The probability of pluralistic ignorance7
The determination of public debt under both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty7
Foreseen risks7
Making predictions based on data: Holistic and atomistic procedures7
Persuading large investors7
Asset bubbles, entrepreneurial risks, and economic growth7
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties7
Editorial Board7
Price impact under heterogeneous beliefs and restricted participation7
Corrigendum to “Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities” [J. Econ. Theory 70 (1996) 93–108]7
Corrigendum to “Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties” [J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019) 104950]7
Biased learning under ambiguous information7
Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders7
On the relationship between damage and deception6
The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition6
On perfect pairwise stable networks6
Spatial search6
Player strength and effort in contests6
Constrained random matching6
Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment6
Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information6
Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction6
Sequential trading with coarse contingencies6
Editorial Board6
Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment6
Inventory, market making, and liquidity in OTC markets6
When does centralization undermine adaptation?6
Nominal rigidities, rational inattention, and the optimal monetary policy6
Rational inattention when decisions take time5
HANK on speed: Robust nonlinear solutions using automatic differentiation5
Auctions with tokens: Monetary policy as a mechanism design choice5
Ambiguity, information processing, and financial intermediation5
Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games5
Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns5
Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered5
Corrigendum to “Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information” [J. Econ. Theory 145 (2010) 2241–2259]5
Intertemporal bundling5
Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion5
Repeated contracting without commitment5
Relationship externalities5
Asset pricing with time preference shocks: Existence and uniqueness5
Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange5
Uncertain product availability in search markets5
Preferences for the resolution of risk and ambiguity5
Adaptive preferences: An evolutionary model of non-expected utility and ambiguity aversion5
A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff5
Sequential network design5
Preference for Knowledge5
Persuasion without ex-post commitment5
Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts4
The central bank, the treasury, or the market: Which one determines the price level?4
Inefficient labor market sorting4
Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games4
There is no known nonlinear Markov perfect equilibrium strategies for the infinite horizon linear quadratic differential game4
Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab4
Regret, responsibility, and randomization: A theory of stochastic choice4
Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition4
Fomenting conflict4
Learning with limited memory: Bayesianism vs heuristics4
Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting4
Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds4
On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium4
The negative value of private information in illiquid markets4
An alternative approach for nonparametric analysis of random utility models4
Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form4
The evolution of risk attitudes with fertility thresholds4
Network-based peer monitoring design4
Reference-dependent choice bracketing4
Blockchain congestion facilitates currency competition4
Information and policing4
Actions and signals4
Selecting a winner with external referees4
Optimal technology design4
Shuttle diplomacy4
Endogenous liquidity and volatility4
Moral hazard and subjective evaluation4
Dynamic banking with non-maturing deposits4
Editorial Board4
Random quasi-linear utility4
Data-driven contract design4
Costly subjective learning4
Redistributive fiscal policy and marginal propensities to consume4
Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies4
Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information4
Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection3
Consumer heterogeneity and inefficiency in oligopoly markets3
On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking3
The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection3
Insider trading with penalties in continuous time3
Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions3
Persuasion with verifiable information3
Labor markets during pandemics3
Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences3
On-the-job wage dynamics3
Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and narrow banking3
Haves and have-nots: A theory of economic sufficientarianism3
Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship3
Partially constructed sequential equilibrium3
Virus dynamics with behavioral responses3
Endogenous business cycles in overlapping generations models with time inconsistency3
Strategic mistakes3
Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem3
Extrapolative asset pricing3
Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication3
Dynamic information design in an entry game3
Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching3
Corrigendum to “Relation Between a Social Welfare Function and the Gini Index of Income Inequality” Journal of Economic Theory 4 (1972): 98-1003
Structural unemployment, underemployment, and secular stagnation3
Insider trading with penalties3
Offshoring and the distribution of skills3
Learning about ambiguous long-term prospects3
The analogical foundations of cooperation3
Undominated monopoly regulation3
Editorial Board3
Stochastic sorting3
Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems3
The strategic decentralization of recruiting3
Market versus optimum allocation in open economies3
Widening access in university admissions3
Logic-based updating3
On bankruptcy in general equilibrium with uncertainty3
Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited3
Efficient risk sharing and separation3
Intermediation as rent extraction3
Correlation concern3
Which Experiments Test a Model?3
Risk aversion with nothing to lose2
Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting2
Positive and negative selection in bargaining2
Editorial Board2
Optimal contingent delegation2
Self-evident events and the value of linking2
Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games2
A theory of debt maturity and innovation2
Sufficient conditions for a “simple” decentralization with consumption externalities2
Information design through scarcity and social learning2
Growing attention2
Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans2
Competition in costly talk2
Signaling covertly acquired information2
The epistemic spirit of divinity2
Portfolio concentration, portfolio inertia, and ambiguous correlation2
Homophily and influence2
Goodwill in communication2
Evolutionary foundation for heterogeneity in risk aversion2
Beliefs and the net worth trap2
Comment on “A theoretical foundation of ambiguity measurement” [J. Econ. Theory 187 (2020) 105001]2
As strong as the weakest node: The impact of misinformation in social networks2
Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management2
Editorial Board2
Repeated communication with private lying costs2
On the voluntary disclosure of redundant information2
Fragility under joint financing: The (moral) hazards of diversification2
Endogenous criteria for success2
Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule2
Culture and communication2
Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem2
Mediated talk: An experiment2
Wealth, endogenous collateral quality, and financial crises2
Information design with endogenous state verification2
The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union2
A dynamic Roy model of academic specialization2
Climate payments: A Coase theorem2
Editorial Board2
Optimal discriminatory disclosure2
Sorting expertise2
Personalized pricing, network effects, and commitment2
A population's feasible posterior beliefs2
Interest rate dynamics and commodity prices2
Information design in optimal auctions2
Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types2
Automation and top entrepreneurial income inequality2
Regulating oligopolistic competition2
Editorial Board2
Editorial Board2
Editorial Board2
Feedback design in games with ambiguity-averse players2
Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search2
When (not) to publicize inspection results2
Time-consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting2
Comment on “Assignment problems with complementarities” [J. Econ. Theory 165 (2016) 209-241]2
Modeling machine learning: A cognitive economic approach2
Unidirectional incentive compatibility2
Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach2
Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition2
Existence of an equilibrium in arrowian markets for consumption externalities2
Dynamic consistency and rectangularity for the smooth ambiguity model2
Bubbly bailout2
A new approach to the uniqueness of equilibrium with CRRA preferences2
Unemployment risks and intra-household insurance2
Co-essentiality of money and credit: A mechanism-design view1
Corrigendum to “Bubbles and constraints on debt accumulation” [J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992) 245–256]1
Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic1
Optimal epidemic control in equilibrium with imperfect testing and enforcement1
A revealed preference approach to approximate utility maximisation1
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