Journal of Industrial Economics

Papers
(The TQCC of Journal of Industrial Economics is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-04-01 to 2024-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists*33
Competing with Big Data*29
Platform Encroachment and Own‐Content Bias*22
Estimating Consumer Inertia in Repeated Choices of Smartphones*13
Self‐Preferencing in Markets with Vertically Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms*13
The Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index and the Distribution of Social Surplus*11
Technology Protectionism and the Patent System: Evidence from China10
The only Dance in Town: Unique Equilibrium in a Generalized Model of Price Competition*9
Price Leadership and Uncertainty About Future Costs*9
Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions9
Demand for Rarity: Evidence from a Collectible Good*8
Local News Online: Aggregators, Geo‐Targeting and the Market for Local News*8
Downstream Cross‐Holdings and Upstream R&D*8
Why is Distance Important for Hospital Choice? Separating Home Bias From Transport Costs*8
Pricing Patterns in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Unilateral Market Power or Coordinated Behavior?*7
Forward Contracts, Market Structure and the Welfare Effects of Mergers7
Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews*7
Technology Choice and Coalition Formation in Standards Wars6
The Strategic Industry Supply Curve*6
Subcontracting Network Formation Among U.S. Airline Carriers*5
Productivity Decomposition in Heterogeneous Industries*5
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*5
Delegation of Regulation*5
Welfare Improving Horizontal Mergers in Successive Oligopoly*4
Collusion Along the Learning Curve: Theory and Evidence From the Semiconductor Industry*4
Stackelberg Independence*4
A New Approach to Estimating State Dependence in Consumers’ Brand Choices Applied to 762 Pharmaceutical Markets*4
Local Network Effects in the Adoption of a Digital Platform*4
Market Power and Patent Strategies: Evidence from Renaissance Venice4
Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information*3
The Impact of Environmental Fraud on the Used Car Market: Evidence from Dieselgate*3
Comparison Between Uniform Tariff and Progressive Consumption Tax in the Chinese Automobile Industry*3
A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players*3
Patent Licensing, Non‐Practising Entities, and Investment in R&D*3
Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations*3
Choice of Policy Instruments with Endogenous Quality: Per‐Passenger and Per‐Flight Airport Charges in Japan*3
Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden*3
Strategic Complementarities in Bank Branching Decisions*3
Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market*3
Local Market Structure and Consumer Prices: Evidence from a Retail Merger*3
Organizational Structure and Technological Investment*3
Antitrust Limits on Patent Settlements: A New Approach*2
No Beer No Friends: Quantifying the Effect of the Beer Boycott*2
The Impact of Competition on Investment: Evidence From California Hospitals*2
Platform Investment and price parity clauses*2
Input Price Discrimination, Two‐Part Tariffs and Bargaining*2
Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms2
Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*2
Consumer Information and Price Transmission: Empirical Evidence*2
Demand‐Driven Technical Change and Productivity Growth: Theory and Evidence from the Energy Policy Act2
Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future*2
On the Absence of Directional Price Discrimination in the U.S. Airline Industry*2
On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts*2
A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Under Productivity Heterogeneity*2
Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare*2
New Product Introduction and Slotting Fees*2
0.061484098434448