Philosophical Studies

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophical Studies is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-06-01 to 2025-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
Response to commentary on “Allocation of scarce resources, disability, and parity”29
Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus29
Correction to: Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization22
Knowledge and merely predictive evidence18
The laws of modality14
Scientific understanding as narrative intelligibility11
Why bother with so what?11
Mind the gap: noncausal explanations of dual properties11
What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception11
Ability predicates, or there and back again11
Classical foundationalism and the dawning light10
Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?10
Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory10
In search of lost principles: generic generalism in aesthetics and ethics10
Still guilty9
Group agents, moral competence and duty-bearers: the update argument9
Precis: the world philosophy made9
Liberal legitimacy and future citizens9
Précis of The Fragmentation of Being9
The independence solution to grue9
Things dreamt: a response to Berislav Marusic8
What are we to do? Making sense of ‘joint ought’ talk8
Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs8
Two conceptions of absolute generality8
Intersectionality as emergence8
Blaming friends8
Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism8
What’s positive and negative about generics: a constrained indexical approach8
Strict dominance and symmetry7
Irony in song7
Correction to: Greatest surprise reduction semantics: an information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction7
The possibility of undistinguishedness7
The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: a reply to Benn7
On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases7
“Précis of Bias: A Philosophical Study”6
The essential superficiality of the voluntary and the moralization of psychology6
Specificity and what is meant6
Thanks for being, loving, and believing6
Entrapment, temptation and virtue testing6
Brown on infallibilism’s problem with testimony6
Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons6
Inherent and probabilistic naturalness6
Sorites and Inclosure6
Hylemorphic animalism and conjoined twins6
Logicality in natural language5
Silence as complicity and action as silence5
Testimonial knowledge and content preservation5
Incommensurability and consistency5
Independent alternatives5
Vice-based accounts of moral evil5
Deontology and safe artificial intelligence5
Libertarianism, decision-making, and a point of no return5
Limitative computational explanations5
When should one be open-minded?5
The ins and outs of conscious belief5
The aesthetics of coming to know someone5
Social kind essentialism5
Supererogation and conditional obligation5
Knowledge without dogmatism5
The self-reinforcing nature of joint action5
Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias5
Can we compare health states when our standards change?5
Extension and replacement5
Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like5
Grievance politics and identities of resentment4
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future4
Becoming oneself online: narrative self-constitution and the internet4
Structural causes of citation gaps4
Relief from Rescue4
Promotionalism, orthogonality, and instrumental convergence4
Implicating fictional truth4
Who cares if we’re not fully real? Comments on Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being4
Persistence and Structure4
Moral worth, right reasons and counterfactual motives4
Justification and the knowledge-connection4
Locative grounding harmony4
Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms4
Perceptual expertise, universality, and objectivity4
No Grounds for Fictionalism4
Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility4
The medical model, with a human face4
Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence4
Closure and the structure of justification4
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation4
Roads to anti-descriptivism (about reference fixing): replies to Soames, Raatikainen, and Devitt3
In search of doxastic involuntarism3
Abduction, Skepticism, and Indirect Realism3
Neurodiversity, identity, and hypostatic abstraction3
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false3
A new rationalist account of the development of false-belief understanding3
Rights reclamation3
Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics3
Consistency, possibility, and Gödel: a reply to Pruss3
Disagreements in understanding3
Global expressivism as global subjectivism3
Four prejudices about scientific discovery and how to resolve them – with Alzheimer´s disease as a case study3
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being3
Everything but the kitchen sink: how (not) to give a plenitudinarian solution to the paradox of flexible origin essentialism3
Justification as a dimension of rationality3
“Attributionism and degrees of Praiseworthiness”3
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?3
Moral criticism, hypocrisy, and pragmatics3
Laying ghosts to rest3
Correction to: Two-step approaches to healthcare allocation: how helpful is parity in selecting eligible options?3
Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes3
What Is Rational Sentimentalism?3
Risk-taking and tie-breaking3
Rationally irresolvable disagreement3
Indeterminacy and collective harms3
Reply to my critics3
Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity3
Mananas, flusses and jartles: belief ascriptions in light of peripheral concept variation3
Correction to: Evidence and truth3
Bread prices and sea levels: why probabilistic causal models need to be monotonic3
Living without microphysical supervenience3
Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification3
Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism3
Informational richness and its impact on algorithmic fairness3
Perceptual warrant and internal access3
“Grasping” Morality3
Allocation of scarce resources, disability, and parity3
How not to intervene on mental causes3
Intention reconsideration in artificial agents: a structured account3
Attention and cognitive penetration: reflections on Dustin Stokes’ Thinking and Perceiving3
The hard proxy problem: proxies aren’t intentional; they’re intentional3
Difference-making and the control relation that grounds responsibility in hierarchical groups3
Real and ideal rationality3
Welfare comparisons within and across species3
Correction To: Credence and belief3
A new challenge for contingentists3
Sor juana dreams of freedom: some comments on Dr. Aspe3
Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction3
Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy2
Affect, desire and interpretation2
Reconceptualizing solidarity as power from below2
The hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons2
Correction to: The structure of epistemic probabilities2
Does being a ‘bad feminist’ make me a hypocrite? Politics, commitments and moral consistency2
Free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics2
What’s in a name? Qualitativism and parsimony2
The structure of moral encroachment2
Trying without fail2
Panpsychism and ensemble explanations2
A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory2
Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks2
Understanding blame2
Perceiving as knowing in the predictive mind2
From the analogy of being to modes of being?2
Proportionality and combat trauma2
Punitive intent2
Maladjustment2
Paradoxes of validity2
Normativity, prudence and welfare2
Borderline consciousness, when it’s neither determinately true nor determinately false that experience is present2
When and why to empathize with political opponents2
Explaining social kinds: the role of covert normativity2
Expressivism about explanatory relevance2
Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’2
Lying: Knowledge or belief?2
Proportionality in the Aggregate2
Incommensurability and population-level bioethics2
Pluralities, counterparts, and groups2
Self-referring as self-directed action2
What we know when we act2
Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth2
Degrees of incoherence, Dutch bookability & guidance value2
Deferentialism: Soames on legal interpretation2
Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil2
Normative concepts and the return to Eden2
Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence2
Correction to: Animals in the order of public reason2
What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought2
Anti-descriptivism 2.02
Can one understand explanations of aesthetic value via testimony? Exploration of an issue from Sosa Epistemic Explanations Ch.12
Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection2
Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertain2
Taught rules: Instruction and the evolution of norms2
Luck egalitarianism without moral tyranny2
Correction To: ‘Book Symposium: Julia Staffel’s Unsettled Thoughts’2
The new internalism about prudential value2
Withhold by default: a difference between epistemic and practical rationality2
The matter of motivating reasons2
The boundaries of gnoseology2
A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre2
From representationalism to identity representationalism2
The moral parody argument against panpsychism2
Wondering about the future2
Epistemic negligence: between performance and evidence2
Supersubstantivalism and vague location2
AI safety: a climb to Armageddon?2
A new principle of plural harm2
Are the folk utilitarian about animals?2
External world scepticism and self scepticism2
Coherence in Science: A Social Approach2
Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes2
Précis for Unsettled Thoughts1
Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic1
On fellowship1
Experientialism Unidealized1
The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation1
Reflecting on believability: on the epistemic approach to justifying implicit commitments1
The perceptual learning of socially constructed kinds: how culture biases and shapes perception1
Quine, evidence, and our science1
Algorithmic fairness and resentment1
Can our reasons determine what it is rational for us to believe?1
Definition by proxy1
Epistemic blame as relationship modification: reply to Smartt1
Two-step approaches to healthcare allocation: how helpful is parity in selecting eligible options?1
Wanting what’s not best1
Vague perception1
Safety’s coordination problems1
Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?1
Agency and aesthetic identity1
Correction to Credence and belief1
Replies to critics1
Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem1
Making desires satisfied, making satisfied desires1
The procreation asymmetry asymmetry1
Vague connectives1
A trilemma for the lexical utility model of the precautionary principle1
Reasons, intentions, and actions1
The problem of collective impact: why helping doesn’t do the trick1
What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’1
In defense of teleological intuitions1
Slurs under quotation1
The problem of unarticulated truths1
Moral laws and moral worth1
Subject-matter and intensional operators I: conditional-agnostic analytic implication1
Correction to: On Believing Indirectly for Practical Reasons1
Power and activity: a dynamic do-over*1
Is there such a thing as felicitous underspecification?1
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering1
In defense of genuine un-forgiving1
Correction to: Avowals and the project of inferentialism1
Imperative inference and practical rationality1
Humean Rationalism1
Proximal intentions intentionalism1
Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas1
One: but not the same1
Connecting the dots: hypergraphs to analyze and visualize the joint-contribution of premises and conclusions to the validity of arguments1
Validity as a thick concept1
Causal inference from clinical experience1
Precis of being rational and being right1
On Cotnoir’s two notions of proper parthood1
One or two? A Process View of pregnancy1
Comments on Kelly: Against Positing a Non-Pejorative Sense of ‘Bias’1
Sensory fields: the visual and the bodily1
Fat-calling: ascriptions of fatness that subordinate1
An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism1
Gender identity: the subjective fit account1
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