Philosophical Studies

Papers
(The TQCC of Philosophical Studies is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-08-01 to 2025-08-01.)
ArticleCitations
Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus35
Response to commentary on “Allocation of scarce resources, disability, and parity”34
Correction to: Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization23
Knowledge and merely predictive evidence15
Is “Dysfunction” a Value-Neutral Concept?13
The laws of modality13
Why bother with so what?12
Liberal legitimacy and future citizens11
Mind the gap: noncausal explanations of dual properties11
Socrates on virtue, conventional goods, and happiness: a game-theoretic analysis11
Still guilty11
Classical foundationalism and the dawning light11
Group agents, moral competence and duty-bearers: the update argument10
The independence solution to grue10
The multidimensional profile methodology (MPM) for comparative cognition: towards a universal strategy of understanding animal minds10
In search of lost principles: generic generalism in aesthetics and ethics10
Scientific understanding as narrative intelligibility10
What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception10
Ability predicates, or there and back again10
Blaming friends9
Précis of The Fragmentation of Being9
Things dreamt: a response to Berislav Marusic9
Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?9
Precis: the world philosophy made9
Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory9
Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs8
Two conceptions of absolute generality8
What are we to do? Making sense of ‘joint ought’ talk8
Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism8
What’s positive and negative about generics: a constrained indexical approach8
The possibility of undistinguishedness7
Correction to: Greatest surprise reduction semantics: an information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction7
Inherent and probabilistic naturalness7
Thanks for being, loving, and believing7
Irony in song7
Strict dominance and symmetry7
“Précis of Bias: A Philosophical Study”7
Intersectionality as emergence7
On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases7
The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: a reply to Benn7
The essential superficiality of the voluntary and the moralization of psychology7
Deontology and safe artificial intelligence6
Hylemorphic animalism and conjoined twins6
Independent alternatives6
Extension and replacement6
Entrapment, temptation and virtue testing6
Specificity and what is meant6
The aesthetics of coming to know someone6
Brown on infallibilism’s problem with testimony6
Sorites and Inclosure6
Libertarianism, decision-making, and a point of no return5
When should one be open-minded?5
Knowledge without dogmatism5
Vice-based accounts of moral evil5
Supererogation and conditional obligation5
Logicality in natural language5
Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias5
Incommensurability and consistency5
Can we compare health states when our standards change?5
Social kind essentialism5
Semantics, lying, and additive particularised conversational implicatures5
The self-reinforcing nature of joint action5
Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons5
Limitative computational explanations5
Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like5
Silence as complicity and action as silence5
The medical model, with a human face4
Structural causes of citation gaps4
Becoming oneself online: narrative self-constitution and the internet4
Grievance politics and identities of resentment4
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation4
Promotionalism, orthogonality, and instrumental convergence4
The Gödel case and beyond: Reassessing the cross-cultural style of semantics4
Informational richness and its impact on algorithmic fairness4
Perceptual warrant and internal access4
“Grasping” Morality4
Correction to: Two-step approaches to healthcare allocation: how helpful is parity in selecting eligible options?4
Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility4
Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms4
Locative grounding harmony4
Perceptual expertise, universality, and objectivity4
No Grounds for Fictionalism4
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future4
Abduction, Skepticism, and Indirect Realism4
Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence4
Moral worth, right reasons and counterfactual motives4
Justification and the knowledge-connection4
Who cares if we’re not fully real? Comments on Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being4
Closure and the structure of justification4
Testimonial knowledge and content preservation4
Implicating fictional truth4
Persistence and Structure4
Correction to: Evidence and truth3
Sor juana dreams of freedom: some comments on Dr. Aspe3
Risk-taking and tie-breaking3
Indeterminacy and collective harms3
A new rationalist account of the development of false-belief understanding3
Mananas, flusses and jartles: belief ascriptions in light of peripheral concept variation3
Reply to my critics3
A new challenge for contingentists3
Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes3
Difference-making and the control relation that grounds responsibility in hierarchical groups3
Rationally irresolvable disagreement3
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?3
Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism3
Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity3
Consistency, possibility, and Gödel: a reply to Pruss3
Rights reclamation3
“Attributionism and degrees of Praiseworthiness”3
Welfare comparisons within and across species3
Real and ideal rationality3
Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics3
Justification as a dimension of rationality3
Four prejudices about scientific discovery and how to resolve them – with Alzheimer´s disease as a case study3
What Is Rational Sentimentalism?3
Correction To: Credence and belief3
Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification3
Moral criticism, hypocrisy, and pragmatics3
Allocation of scarce resources, disability, and parity3
How not to intervene on mental causes3
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being3
Disagreements in understanding3
The hard proxy problem: proxies aren’t intentional; they’re intentional3
Bread prices and sea levels: why probabilistic causal models need to be monotonic3
Attention and cognitive penetration: reflections on Dustin Stokes’ Thinking and Perceiving3
Testing name swapping: Is Beyoncé really famous?3
Conditional oughts and contrastive reasons3
Global expressivism as global subjectivism3
Private praise3
Neurodiversity, identity, and hypostatic abstraction3
Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’2
Trying without fail2
The hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons2
Coherence in Science: A Social Approach2
Intention reconsideration in artificial agents: a structured account2
Panpsychism and ensemble explanations2
The matter of motivating reasons2
Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil2
Self-referring as self-directed action2
Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks2
Degrees of incoherence, Dutch bookability & guidance value2
From the analogy of being to modes of being?2
Acting for reasons and the metaphysics of time2
Affect, desire and interpretation2
A new principle of plural harm2
Understanding blame2
Can one understand explanations of aesthetic value via testimony? Exploration of an issue from Sosa Epistemic Explanations Ch.12
Maladjustment2
When and why to empathize with political opponents2
What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought2
Correction to: The structure of epistemic probabilities2
Epistemic negligence: between performance and evidence2
The boundaries of gnoseology2
Social identity, understanding, and deference2
Withhold by default: a difference between epistemic and practical rationality2
Free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics2
Lying: Knowledge or belief?2
Wondering about the future2
The new internalism about prudential value2
Borderline consciousness, when it’s neither determinately true nor determinately false that experience is present2
A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre2
From representationalism to identity representationalism2
Correction to: Animals in the order of public reason2
The moral parody argument against panpsychism2
Plural harm: plural problems2
Deferentialism: Soames on legal interpretation2
External world scepticism and self scepticism2
Taught rules: Instruction and the evolution of norms2
The normative force of natural laws: Humean and non-Humean accounts of nomic normativity2
Are the folk utilitarian about animals?2
Expressivism about explanatory relevance2
Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection2
Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth2
Correction To: ‘Book Symposium: Julia Staffel’s Unsettled Thoughts’2
Normativity, prudence and welfare2
Does being a ‘bad feminist’ make me a hypocrite? Politics, commitments and moral consistency2
What’s in a name? Qualitativism and parsimony2
Incommensurability and population-level bioethics2
Pluralities, counterparts, and groups2
Expressing (outweighed) reasons: a challenge for expressivism2
Reconceptualizing solidarity as power from below2
A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory2
The structure of moral encroachment2
Doing what’s done: manners, morality, and practical reason2
What we know when we act2
Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence2
Grounding, necessity, and relevance2
AI safety: a climb to Armageddon?2
Proportionality in the Aggregate2
Proportionality and combat trauma2
Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy2
Explaining social kinds: the role of covert normativity2
Supersubstantivalism and vague location2
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