Philosophical Studies

Papers
(The TQCC of Philosophical Studies is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-05-01 to 2024-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Interspecies justice: agency, self-determination, and assent28
Inquiry and the epistemic23
There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch20
Reconsidering the Dispositional Essentialist Canon19
Reflective Situated Normativity18
Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming18
Could a middle level be the most fundamental?17
Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment12
Welfare comparisons within and across species12
The governance of laws of nature: guidance and production11
Explaining contingent facts11
How to engineer a concept10
Infinite aggregation: expanded addition10
Graded epistemic justification10
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering10
The fundamental and the brute9
What theoretical equivalence could not be9
The experience requirement on well-being9
Explaining essences9
The normality of error9
Indicative conditionals: probabilities and relevance9
Cognitive penetration and informational encapsulation: Have we been failing the module?8
Falsifying generic stereotypes8
A pluralist account of the basis of moral status8
Subject-matter and intensional operators I: conditional-agnostic analytic implication8
Akratic (epistemic) modesty8
The epistemic status of the imagination8
Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement8
Still the same dilemma for conceptual engineers: reply to Koch8
Revisionist reporting7
Explicit nonconceptual metacognition7
Narrative testimony7
The dark side of niche construction7
Function essentialism about artifacts7
To lie or to mislead?7
Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’7
Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency6
Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection6
One or two? A Process View of pregnancy6
Being in a position to know6
Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws6
Agnosticism as settled indecision6
What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing?6
Supererogation and conditional obligation6
The psychological speciesism of humanism6
From relational equality to personal responsibility6
A pluralistic account of degrees of control in addiction6
Aesthetic knowledge6
Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence6
Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge6
Social kinds are essentially mind-dependent6
Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization5
Lying: Knowledge or belief?5
A robust hybrid theory of well-being5
Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence5
The incentives account of feasibility5
Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism5
Escaping the natural attitude about gender5
“What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”5
An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure5
The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion5
Higher-order metaphysics and the tropes versus universals dispute5
Counterfactual theories of causation and the problem of large causes5
Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?5
The only ethical argument for positive δ? Partiality and pure time preference5
Mental imagery: pulling the plug on perceptualism5
Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?5
Speciesism and tribalism: embarrassing origins5
Tamers, deniers, and me5
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth5
Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason5
Malleable character: organizational behavior meets virtue ethics and situationism4
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons4
What’s so naïve about naïve realism?4
The self-effacing functionality of blame4
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value4
Living without microphysical supervenience4
Being and holding responsible: Reconciling the disputants through a meaning-based Strawsonian account4
Epistemology without guidance4
A new principle of plural harm4
Justification and the knowledge-connection4
On making a difference: towards a minimally non-trivial version of the identity of indiscernibles4
Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness4
Classical recapture and maximality4
Disability: a justice-based account4
Explanatory priority monism4
The explanation of logical theorems and reductive truthmakers4
The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism4
When normal is normative: The ethical significance of conforming to reasonable expectations4
The many-property problem is your problem, too4
Emotion and attention4
Legal proof and statistical conjunctions4
Should explanation be a guide to ground?4
Dual processes, dual virtues4
The way things go: moral relativism and suspension of judgment4
When do nudges undermine voluntary consent?4
Reply to critics4
The ethics of emergencies4
Reconceptualizing solidarity as power from below4
Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck3
Work and social alienation3
Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry3
Emotions as modulators of desire3
Setting the story straight: fictionalism about grounding3
Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection3
Is higher-order evidence evidence?3
Responses to Herman Cappelen and Jennifer Nado3
Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism3
Intrinsicality and the classification of uninstantiable properties3
Assertion remains strong3
Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality3
Knowledge of future contingents3
Physicalism without supervenience3
Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysis3
Agential capacities: a capacity to guide3
Arbitrary grounding3
Categoricity by convention3
Agents of change: temporal flow and feeling oneself act3
Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty: a trilemma3
Centering the Principal Principle3
Two grounds of liability3
Situationism, capacities and culpability3
Recognition trust3
Real and ideal rationality3
Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation3
Saving the armchair by experiment: what works in economics doesn’t work in philosophy3
Plural harm: plural problems3
Blur and interoceptive vision3
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future3
Identifying finite cardinal abstracts3
The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission3
Wanting what’s not best3
The irrelevance of intentions to refer: demonstratives and demonstrations3
Pluralities, counterparts, and groups3
Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief3
Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias3
Global expressivism as global subjectivism3
The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness)3
Convention, correlation and consistency3
Rational monism and rational pluralism3
Rationally irresolvable disagreement3
Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?3
Cultural appropriation and aesthetic normativity3
Regrettable beliefs3
Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable3
The case for egalitarian consciousness raising in higher education3
Structural causes of citation gaps3
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?2
Knowledge from multiple experiences2
At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing2
What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought2
The prospects of emotional dogmatism2
Towards a logic for ‘because’2
Is ‘cause’ ambiguous?2
Independent alternatives2
Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertain2
The subject and its apparatus: are they ontological trash?2
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning2
A new defense of Tarski's solution to the liar paradox2
Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes)2
Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation2
From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent2
Fictional force2
Illusory attitudes and the playful stoic2
The laws of modality2
Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action2
Russellian physicalism and its dilemma2
How to modify the strength of a reason2
Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks2
Precis of Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests2
Moral rights without balancing2
Philosophizing out of bounds2
Anaphora and negation2
The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war2
The structure of moral encroachment2
Worldly imprecision2
Entrapment, temptation and virtue testing2
Interpretative expressivism: A theory of normative belief2
On the necessity of essence2
Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid2
Flat mechanisms: a reductionist approach to levels in mechanistic explanations2
In search of doxastic involuntarism2
Halfway proportionality2
Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that2
The Nonconsequentialist Argument from Evil2
The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist2
What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception2
Is mutual advantage a general theory of justice? More domain worries2
Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons2
Punitive intent2
One: but not the same2
Why animalism matters2
Against triggering accounts of robust reason-giving2
Slurs under quotation2
Thanks for being, loving, and believing2
The medical model, with a human face2
An impossibility result on methodological individualism2
Population ethics in an infinite universe2
Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes2
Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire2
Hybrid theories, psychological plausibility, and the human/animal divide2
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being2
In defense of Countabilism2
Correction to: Transformative experience and the shark problem2
You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence2
What if ideal advice conflicts? A dilemma for idealizing accounts of normative practical reasons2
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