Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-04-01 to 2025-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains29
Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’24
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking18
Number nativism115
Suffering as experiential—A response to Jennifer Corns14
Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of visual working memory14
Intention Persistence14
Précis of fellow creatures: Our obligations to the other animals13
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation111
Issue Information11
Précis: Concern, Respect, and Cooperation10
Issue Information9
Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum9
The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term8
Issue Information8
Margaret Gilbert on “Rights and Demands”8
Personal ideals and the ideal of rational agency17
Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible7
Responses to critics7
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization6
Issue Information6
Prior's puzzle generalized6
6
5
Replies to Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou5
Comments on McGrath5
The aim of inquiry?5
Moral knowledge precis5
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference5
Issue Information4
Issue Information4
Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*4
Replies to Critics4
Risky belief4
4
Faith and rational deference to authority4
Comment on Gina Schouten4
Précis of Reality+3
A modal theory of justification3
“All for one and one for all”3
The elusive role of normal‐proper function in cognitive science3
The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial3
Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics3
3
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution3
Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism3
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry3
Desire and Goodness3
Response to Neander's Critics3
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology3
Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so?2
Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus2
Accessibilism without consciousness2
Creativity as a higher agency2
Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation*2
2
Good Guesses2
Replies to Critics2
Against anti‐fanaticism2
Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal2
How to be minimalist about shared agency2
The selective advantage of representing correctly2
Nietzsche on art as the good will to appearance2
Ontologically grounding appearances in experience: Transcendental Idealism according to Anja Jauernig's The World According to Kant2
Issue Information2
Structuring Wellbeing*2
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency2
Pragmatic Skepticism2
What is social organizing?2
Longtermism and aggregation2
Two kinds of curiosity2
Time's arrow and self‐locating probability2
Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols2
Parity and Pareto2
Living with absurdity: A Nobleman's guide2
2
Desert of blame2
Justification, normalcy and randomness2
Précis of articulating the moral community1
Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception1
A Counter‐Reformation1
The content of indexical belief1
Credences for strict conditionals1
Philosophy's past: Cognitive values and the history of philosophy1
The unity of knowledge1
Issue Information1
An interpersonal form of faith1
Précis: Liberalism, neutrality, and the gendered division of labor1
Better guesses1
Précis of Physics Avoidance1
Will intelligent machines become moral patients?1
A new problem for rules1
Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation1
Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge1
1
Pain without inference1
Complaints and tournament population ethics1
Why better safe than sensitive1
1
Brute ignorance1
The Utility of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Law1
Issue Information1
Sensible individuation1
Inquiry for the mistaken and confused1
Cullity on The Foundations of Morality1
Reference and morphology*1
Some challenges raised by unconscious belief1
Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity1
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons1
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking1
De se names1
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology1
1
Standing up for supervenience1
Issue Information1
Issue Information1
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism1
Transparency is Surveillance1
Erratum to Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis1
Deviating from the ideal1
Responding to second‐order reasons1
Précis of Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry#1
The relevance of salience for the epistemology of mathematics1
Richardson on moral innovation1
Plato’s Moral Psychology (PMP) distinguishes two theses that might be taken as foundational to Plato’s psychologizing1
The distinct moral importance of acting together1
Animal nature within and without: A comment on Korsgaard's Fellow Creatures1
Autonomy and aesthetic valuing1
Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*1
Of Witches and White Folks*1
Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind1
Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care1
Hume's skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride1
Whose public reason? Which reasonableness?1
Realism Without Rigidity?1
Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up1
Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility1
Issue Information1
Précis of The Border between Seeing and Thinking1
Noncognitivism without expressivism1
Searching for social properties1
Something is true1
Indirect evaluative voluntarism1
Issue Information1
Treating people as individuals and as members of groups1
Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism1
Eliminating epistemic rationality#1
Arguments philosophical and political0
Humans, animals, and the world we share0
Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism0
Absence and objectivity0
The duty to listen0
Moral agency under oppression0
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs0
Symmetric relations, symmetric theories, and Pythagrapheanism0
Ethics without numbers0
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment0
Prudential value and impersonal value0
On Sarah McGrath's Moral Knowledge0
Issue Information0
Foreknowledge requires determinism0
Replies to Lawlor, Goldberg, and Pritchard0
Neopragmatist semantics0
Pragmatic Particularism0
0
Meta‐Skepticism0
The epistemic imagination revisited0
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence0
Moral knowledge replies to critics0
Grounding identity in existence0
Comments on Rachana Kamtekar, Plato’s Moral Psychology0
Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory0
Forgiving, Committing, and Un‐forgiving0
Forever fitting feelings0
Why prevent human extinction?0
Moral Knowledge by Deduction0
Involuntary Wrongdoing and Responsibility in Plato0
Judging for ourselves0
Internalist Semantics: Comments on Paul Pietroski, Conjoining Meanings0
Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success0
How to make up your mind0
Chloe and Fern, Cam and Donna: The denial of moral demand‐rights. Comments on Margaret Gilbert's Rights and Demands: a Foundational Inquiry0
Issue Information0
Rationality: What difference does it make?0
0
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence)0
I expect you to be happy, so I see you smile: A multidimensional account of emotion attribution0
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how0
Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight0
Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check10
Can rules ground moral obligations?0
Issue Information0
The identity of what? Pluralism, practical interests, and individuation0
Is identity non‐contingent?0
Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity0
0
Increasing the risk that someone will die without increasing the risk that you will kill them0
Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes0
Pessimism and procreation0
Theories of perceptual content and cases of reliable spatial misperception0
Comparative opinion loss0
Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren0
0
0
The Geach‐Kaplan sentence reconsidered0
Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching0
What is philosophical progress?0
Abstraction and grounding0
Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game0
Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First0
The new evil demon problem at 400
0
Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind0
Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi0
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance0
Replies to Sherman, Nussbaum, and Berman0
In defense of guilt‐tripping0
Mattering, value, and our obligations to the animals0
Assurance and Disjunctivism0
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe0
Slurring silences0
Moral worth and skillful action0
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering0
Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account0
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism0
Conditionalism, intrinsicalism, and pleasure in the bad0
The sources of moral knowledge0
Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models0
Causal decision theory, context, and determinism0
Between perception and thought0
Imagination as a process0
0
Demoralizing Recognition0
The End of Explanation: Kant on the Unconditioned0
Dutch‐booking indicative conditionals0
Block on perceptual variation, attribution, discrimination, and adaptation0
Excessive testimony: When less is more0
Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism10
Hinge trust*0
Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo0
The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness0
Meaning without Information: Comments on Paul Pietroski'sConjoining Meanings0
Overthrow the Orthodoxy! Replies to Hill, Titus, and Sosa0
When the Concrete is Hard0
Trust and trustworthiness0
The Euthyphro challenge in metasemantics0
The Question of Iterated Causation0
Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*0
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?0
Neander on a Mark of the Mental0
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