Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Article	Citations
Replies to Critics	42
Issue Information	26
Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum	18
Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*	17
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation1	15
Longtermism and aggregation	14
Risky belief	14
How to be minimalist about shared agency	14
No right to an explanation	14
Plato’s Moral Psychology (PMP) distinguishes two theses that might be taken as foundational to Plato’s psychologizing	13
Issue Information	12
Why better safe than sensitive	11
Responding to second‐order reasons	10
Précis of Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry#	10
Autonomy and aesthetic valuing	9
Eliminating epistemic rationality#	9
Is Kant's critique of metaphysics obsolete?	9
Treating people as individuals and as members of groups	8
Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care	8
Sensible individuation	8
Deviating from the ideal	7
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency	7
Notes on A Spirit of Trust	7
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons	7
Representation and rationality	7

Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment	6
Epistemic advantage on the margin: A network standpoint Epistemology	6
Languages and language use	6
States of affairs and our connection with the good	6
The do‐able solution to the interface problem	6
Language and representationalism1	6
On proper presupposition	6
On the diverse priorities of autonomous women	6
On Margaret Gilbert's Rights and Demands	5
Arguments philosophical and political	5
Issue Information	5
Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell	5
Issue Information	5
Entitlement and misleading evidence	5
Psychological eudaimonism and the natural desire for the good: Comments on Rachana Kamtekar's Plato's Moral Psychology	5
Replies to Cruft, Radzik, and Misak	5
Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game	4
Neopragmatist semantics	4
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance	4
The duty to listen	4
Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes	4
Imagination as a process	4
Prudential value and impersonal value	4
Abstraction and grounding	4
Meta‐Skepticism	3
Replies to Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou	3
	3
Normality, safety and knowledge	3
Issue Information	3
The selective advantage of representing correctly	3
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence)	3
Nietzschean Autonomy and the Meaning of the “Sovereign Individual”*	3
Intention Persistence	3
Time's arrow and self‐locating probability	2
Number nativism1	2
Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity	2
Assertoric mindreading	2
Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*	2
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking	2
Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility	2
Are there subintentional actions?	2
Fair equality of opportunity and the gendered division of labor	2
The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force	2
On behalf of the moral realist	2
Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature*	2
Is truth inconsistent?	2
Creativity as a higher agency	2
Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal	2
Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus	2
Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism	2

The aim of inquiry?	2
Animal nature within and without: A comment on Korsgaard's Fellow Creatures	2
Desert of blame	2
A causal modeler's guide to double effect reasoning	2
Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments	2
A new well‐being atomism	2
Grounding empirical in transcendental reality	2
The epistemic role of consciousness	2
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization	2
Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of visual working memory	2
	2
Justification, normalcy and randomness	2
Replies to Critics	2
Will intelligent machines become moral patients?	2
Issue Information	2
Structuring Wellbeing*	2
Richardson on the construction of moral norms	2
Knowing to infinity: Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle	2
Heidegger's argument for fascism	2
A sensible experientialism?	2
Living with absurdity: A Nobleman's guide	2
Intellectual humility without limits: Magnanimous humility, disagreement and the epistemology of resistance	1
Judging for ourselves	1
Noncognitivism without expressivism	1
Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility	1
Two kinds of curiosity	1
Parity and Pareto	1
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe	1
Issue Information	1
	1
Leibniz as a virtue ethicist	1
Response to Neander's Critics	1
Gupta has built a magnificent mansion, but can we live in it?	1
Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account	1
The good fit1	1
From singular to plural. . . and beyond?	1
Issue Information	1
Good Guesses	1
Inquiry beyond knowledge	1
What is social organizing?	1
Slurring silences	1
A modal theory of justification	1
Demoralizing Recognition	1
Inquiry for the mistaken and confused	1
Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account	1
Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind	1
Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics	1
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology	1
Replies to Sherman, Nussbaum, and Berman	1
Where does moral knowledge come from?	1
Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge	1
Is identity non‐contingent?	1
Probability discounting and money pumps	1
Margaret Gilbert on “Rights and Demands”	1
Issue Information	1
Pessimism and procreation	1
Awareness by degree	1
Increasing the risk that someone will die without increasing the risk that you will kill them	1
Smithian sympathy and the emergence of norms	1
Pain without inference	1
Emotion, attention, and reason	1
Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’	1
Trust and trustworthiness	1
Against anti‐fanaticism	1
What is conceptual engineering good for? The argument from nameability	1
Issue Information	1
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence	1
Internalizing rules	1
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism	1
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism	1
Can rules ground moral obligations?	1
Précis of articulating the moral community	1
Reference and morphology*	1
	1
Letting go of blame	1
Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success	1
A metalinguistic and computational approach to the problem of mathematical omniscience	1
Issue Information	1
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief	1
Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1	1

Perspectives and good dispositions	1
Replies to Honneth, McDowell, Pippin, and Stern	1
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology	1
Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics	1
Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief	1
Whose public reason? Which reasonableness?	1
Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons	1
Desire and Goodness	1
Comments on Rachana Kamtekar, Plato’s Moral Psychology	1
Margaret cavendish on passion, pleasure, and propriety	1
Issue Information	1
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains	0
Agnostic wrongs and pragmatic disencroachment	0
Précis of fellow creatures: Our obligations to the other animals	0
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how	0
Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot1	0
Locke's Aristotelian theory of quantity	0
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering	0
What the golden rule teaches us about ethics	0
Personal ideals and the ideal of rational agency1	0
Block on perceptual variation, attribution, discrimination, and adaptation	0
On penance	0
Sakes exist	0
Cullity on The Foundations of Morality	0
	0
Welfare and autonomy under risk	0
Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It	0
Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being	0
Valuing animals, nature, and our own animal nature: A reply to Maclean, Schapiro, and Wallace	0
Seeing or Saying?	0
Between perception and thought	0
Moral equality and social hierarchy	0
In the spirit of Hegel?	0
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment	0
Realism Without Rigidity?	0
The sources of moral knowledge	0
Absence and objectivity	0
	0
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference	0
The identity of what? Pluralism, practical interests, and individuation	0
	0
De se names	0
Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account	0
Freedom first: On coercion and coercive offers	0
How to make up your mind	0
The Unity of Normative Thought	0
Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren	0
Legal Rights and Joint Commitment	0
Let's hope we're not living in a simulation	0
Comparative opinion loss	0
The new evil demon problem at 40	0
	0
Précis of A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology	0
Issue Information	0
On Sarah McGrath's Moral Knowledge	0
Attention as selection for action defended	0
Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*	0
Taking the simulation hypothesis seriously	0
Regions, extensions, distances, diameters	0
Decision, causality, and predetermination	0
When the Concrete is Hard	0
Iconicity, 2nd‐order isomorphism, and perceptual categorization	0
Internalist Semantics: Comments on Paul Pietroski, Conjoining Meanings	0
Why prevent human extinction?	0
Naturalized knowledge‐first and the epistemology of groups	0
Nietzsche on art as the good will to appearance	0
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?	0
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry	0
Issue Information	0
	0
	0
Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence	0
	0
Illusory world skepticism	0
Implications of the substantive nature of empirical reason	0
Principles of Proportionate Punishment: Comments on John Deigh, From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism	0
Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*	0
Chance, ability, and control	0
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs	0
Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind	0
Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models	0
Dialetheism and the countermodel problem	0
Forever fitting feelings	0
Ground and Grain	0
Expressivism and moral independence	0
Précis of Seeing and Saying	0
Intentional objects and experience ―Response to my critics	0
Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich	0
Moral agency under oppression	0
Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism1	0
	0
Proper names as counterpart‐theoretic individual concepts	0
Moral knowledge precis	0
Theories of perceptual content and cases of reliable spatial misperception	0
The Euthyphro challenge in metasemantics	0