Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Papers
(The TQCC of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-05-01 to 2024-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Oppressive Things*35
There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame28
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding24
Theory of inquiry23
Transparency is Surveillance20
Epistemic advantage on the margin: A network standpoint Epistemology12
Limits of Abductivism About Logic12
Aesthetic practices and normativity12
Good Guesses11
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs10
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance10
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference10
Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’9
What Makes Something Surprising?9
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will9
Ground and Grain8
Capacities First7
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe7
Infinite Prospects*7
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering7
Perception and Probability6
Infinite Reasoning6
Moral demands and the far future*6
The fragmentation of phenomenal character6
The nature of perceptual constancies6
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*6
Natural goodness without natural history5
Thinking and being sure*5
Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*5
Externalism and exploitability5
The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense5
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how5
Trivializing Informational Consequence5
Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being5
Group Action Without Group Minds5
The epistemic imagination revisited5
Forever fitting feelings5
Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s Down Girl5
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed?*4
Resisting easy inferences14
Degrees of Assertability4
Neopragmatist semantics4
Pragmatic Particularism4
Trust and trustworthiness4
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy4
Forgiving, Committing, and Un‐forgiving4
The Ineffability of Induction4
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism4
Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further4
Pragmatic Skepticism3
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking3
Channels for Common Ground3
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation13
Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success3
Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’: Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle3
Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account3
Gendered affordance perception and unequal domestic labour3
Of Witches and White Folks*3
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency3
The aim of inquiry?3
An explanationist account of genealogical defeat3
Self‐Knowledge: Expression without Expressivism3
Forgetting memory skepticism3
Letting go of blame3
Complaints and tournament population ethics3
The Vices of Perception*3
Punting on the aesthetic question3
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us?3
The Question of Iterated Causation3
Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot13
Are we all exploiters?*3
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence)2
How Valuable Could a Person Be?*2
From metasemantics to analyticity2
Replies to Honneth, McDowell, Pippin, and Stern2
The Shape of the Kantian Mind2
The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory2
Singular troubles with singleton socrates2
Will intelligent machines become moral patients?2
Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*2
Normativity, Agency, and Value: A view from aesthetics2
Nietzschean Autonomy and the Meaning of the “Sovereign Individual”*2
Demoralizing Recognition2
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment2
How Particular Is Perception?2
Gender Policing: Comments on Down Girl2
Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care2
Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis2
The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial2
Précis of The Unity of Perception2
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism2
The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness2
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles2
Eliminating epistemic rationality#2
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons2
The Diversity of Experiences2
The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term2
Jonardon Ganeri’s Transcultural Philosophy of Attention2
Misogyny and Ideological Logic1
On proper presupposition1
Foreknowledge requires determinism1
Reference and morphology*1
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?1
Something is true1
Replies to Lawlor, Goldberg, and Pritchard1
Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*1
Comment on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception1
Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up1
Practical knowledge and error in action1
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution1
Desire and Goodness1
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence1
Spinoza on the Limits of Explanation1
Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable*1
“All for one and one for all”1
Precis1
Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus1
Down Girl Précis1
Procedural chances and the equality of claims1
Causal decision theory, context, and determinism1
Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment1
Is identity non‐contingent?1
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism1
Ethics without numbers1
Norms in Counterfactual Selection1
Grounding identity in existence1
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology1
Neander on a Mark of the Mental1
Living with absurdity: A Nobleman's guide1
Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism11
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology1
Prior's puzzle generalized1
Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons1
Replies to Critics1
Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality1
Response to Neander's Critics1
Commonsense morality and contact with value1
The elusive role of normal‐proper function in cognitive science1
Decision, causality, and predetermination1
Seeing and visual reference1
Meta‐Skepticism1
A new well‐being atomism1
Theories of perceptual content and cases of reliable spatial misperception1
Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols1
Replies to Commentators1
Realism Without Rigidity?1
Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching1
How literature expands your imagination1
Aspiring to be rational1
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry1
A Problem for Ganeri’s Buddhaghosa1
Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight1
Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible1
Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive1
Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics1
Perceptual Capacities, Success, and Content1
Expertise and Evaluation1
The Right Wrong‐Makers1
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief1
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