Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytic

Papers
(The median citation count of Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytic is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-06-01 to 2026-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
Towards a Realist Shifty Semantic Account of Moral Vagueness9
Value Approaches to Virtue and Vice: Intrinsic, Instrumental, or Hybrid?6
On the Explanatory Role of Norms: A Naturalist Approach to the Value-Ladenness of the Social World5
Neutral But Better: The Possibility of Null Hierarchies4
Computational Approaches to Concepts Representation: A Whirlwind Tour4
Truth-Ratios, Evidential Fit, and Deferring to Informants with Low Error Probabilities3
A Panpsychist Solution to the Exclusion Problem3
Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism3
Defending Pure Moral Deference: an Argument from Rationality3
The Epistemic Benefits of Ideological Diversity3
Modelling Collective Epistemic Trust2
The Morality and Aesthetics of Personal Beauty2
The Classic Inherence Theory of Attributes: Its Theses and Their Errors2
Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument2
Applying Alex Broadbent’s Reverse Counterfactual Theory to the Outbreak of World War I: A Novel Causal Analysis2
Why Be Realists About Artifact Kinds?2
Sensitivity: Checking into Knowing?2
Correction to: Carroll’s Regress Times Three2
Why Be Rational?2
Antipathy as an Emotion2
Representational Solution to the Messenger-Shooting Objection2
Epistemic Bystander2
We Can Defend Normative Error Theory2
On the Cardinality Argument Against Quidditism1
Essentialist Arguments for Discernibility are Unsound1
Revisiting Fodor’s Argument Against the Unity of Science1
Della Rocca’s Relations Regress and Bradley’s Relations Regresses1
Causality and Reliability1
Progress in Understanding Consciousness? Easy and Hard Problems, and Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives1
Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind1
Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism1
Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument1
Moral Enhancement Is Irrational1
Explaining Higher-order Defeat1
Fiction, Identity, and Existence: A Study in Experimental Philosophy1
Associative Inferential Transitions, or One Problem with Siegel’s Response Hypothesis1
Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation1
Deontic Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem1
Relativism and Intracultural Conflict1
A Plea for Commonality Thesis1
Perception Under Constraint: A Dual-Constraint Model Reconciling Positivism and Constructivism1
Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases1
Knowing What One Likes: Epistemicist Solution to Faultless Disagreement1
The Principle of Total Evidence: Justification and Political Significance1
Does Neuroscience Provide Reasons for Anti-Retributivist Penal Reform?1
Deduction, Abduction, and Creativity1
High Hopes for Eternalism1
On Whether It Is and What It Is1
Descartes vs. the Scholastics: Lessons from Contemporary Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience1
On Semantic and Ontic Truth1
The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion1
A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments1
Composition as Trans-Scalar Identity0
What Do We Owe Experts? Epistemic Authority and Social Responsibility0
An Ultimate Argument Against Nominalistic Relationalism0
Value Pluralism versus Value Monism0
Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism0
On the Factivity Problem for Contextualism0
Correction to: Priority Perdurantism and Ordinary Temporary Predication0
The Absurdity of Pannormism0
Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?0
Disentangling GPS from Nudging: Why the Distinction Matters for the Ethics of Nudging0
Why Mereological Anti-Conservatism Is No Better Than Conservatism0
The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism0
Reasoning with maps, a dynamic approach0
Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities0
How Long Does a Time Last?0
Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?0
Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge0
A Note on Knowing and Checking0
Are Stereotypers Wronged When Stereotyped? On Defeated Doxastic Rights and Structural, Doxastic Injustice0
Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals0
Scientific Realism vs. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Critical Rationalist Approach0
What the Remnant Person Problem Really Implies0
Communication Without Shared Meanings0
Doxastic Precautionary Principle as Political Encroachment0
Taming Holism: an Inferentialist Account of Communication0
Common Ground and Charity in Conflict0
For the Sake of Knowledge: The Epistemic Value of Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues0
Scientific Understanding: No Veritism Without Realism, No Realism Without Veritism0
In Defense of Parfit’s Ontology0
Correction to: Reasoning With Maps, a Dynamic Approach0
Moral Responsibility in a Vat0
Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification0
Dead Past, Ad hocness, and Zombies0
Evidential Incognizance0
From Enumerative Induction to Mathematical Consistency0
On Wittgenstein’s Dispensation with “ = ” in the Tractatus and its Philosophical Background. A Critical Study0
Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms0
Suspension of Judgment, Non-additivity, and Additivity of Possibilities0
Armchair Epistemology: Knowledge, Necessity, and Epistemic Luck0
Personal and Subpersonal Explanations in Forensic Psychiatry: A Co-evolutionary Perspective0
Moral Generalizations and Moral Explanatory Pluralism0
Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective0
Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation0
Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and KK-Failure0
Partially Autonomous Belief0
Is There a Disappearing Agent Problem for Agent Causalists?0
Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism0
Priority Perdurantism and Ordinary Temporary Predication0
Social Progress: When and How? Two Conservative Responses and Their Limits0
Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms0
How the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotions Can Account for Valence and Irrationality: Reply to Objections0
Dead Past Minus the Zombies0
Naturalism: Deep Disagreement or Metalinguistic Negotiation?0
Intercorporeality and the Problem of Other Minds0
Justified Evidence Resistance0
Contextualism, Sensitivity, and Skepticism0
From Metaphysics to Methods?: Pluralism in Cancer Research0
Adequacy of Representations as their Approximation to Truth: A Non-factive Theory of Knowledge0
Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox0
Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion0
The Logic of Proper Accidents0
Avoiding Strawson’s Crude Opposition: How to Straddle the Participant and Objective Stances0
Wittgenstein on the Intelligibility of the Tractatus0
Introduction to the Special Issue0
Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach0
The No-Content View of Contradictions0
The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance0
Do Corporations Deserve Moral Consideration?0
The Non-Reductionist View of the Self in Tension with the Block Universe0
Identity Theory and Falsifiability0
Mereological Anti-Conservatism0
Method Before Ontology: Reconstructing the Core of Eliminative Materialism0
Analytic Epistemology and Armchair Psychology0
Even Bigger-Picture Causalism0
ACT-Endorsing Libertarianism, Constitutive Luck, and Basic Moral Responsibility0
Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution0
What Is Identity? Frege’s Argument in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ Scrutinized and Newly Interpreted with Glances at Grundgesetze0
Knowledge as a Social Kind0
Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough0
Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions0
Panpsychist Perspectives on Free Will: Compatibilism and Libertarianism, and Constitutive and Non-constitutive Panpsychism0
Explanatory Relevance of Ineffable Qualia0
Against Infinite Intensive Magnitudes: A Reply to Pruss0
The Subset View of Realization and the Part-Whole Problem0
Qualification in Philosophy0
Carnap and Quine on Explanationism in Ontology0
Pragmatic Encroachment Defended: A Response to Wolfgang Barz0
Intuition is Evidence0
Beyond Impossibility0
The Problem of Other-Awareness0
Neo-Humean Moral Contingentism0
Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution0
Norms of Constatives0
Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: An Attributionist View0
How Seemings Resolve Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism0
Carroll’s Regress Times Three0
Platonism in Better Shape0
Intention, Action, and De Se Indexicality0
Slurs and Insults: a Reply to David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms”0
Many Bombers of the Principle of Double Effect: An Analysis of Strategic/Terror Bomber Thought Experiment Variants0
The Epistemology of Skeptical Theism, Excessive Skepticism, and Hendricks’ Epistemic Gambit0
Existence Is Not Relativistically Invariant—Part 1: Meta-ontology0
The Prudential 'Now What?' Problem0
Checking and the Argument from Inquiry0
Truthmaker Semantics, Disjunction, and Fundamentals0
Social Epistemology and Epidemiology0
Fragmentalism and Tensed Truths0
What is Existence? A Matter of Co(n)text0
Rational Inconsistency Against Non-skeptical Infallibilism0
The Cogito, Dreamt Characters, and Unreal Existence0
False Authorities0
Checking out Checking0
De re Necessity and de se Intention: Defending a Further Restricted Essential Indexical Thesis0
What’s Wrong With Swearing?0
Lost Disagreement: On Predicates of Personal Taste and the Superiority Approach0
A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism0
Deflating Predicativism Against the Small Clause Hypothesis for Proper Names0
Metaethics as Therapy0
The Right to Forgiveness0
On Functional Plurality: A Taxonomy of Benign and Problematic Functions0
Necessary Facts0
What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories0
Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action0
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