Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytic

Papers
(The median citation count of Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytic is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-11-01 to 2025-11-01.)
ArticleCitations
Value Approaches to Virtue and Vice: Intrinsic, Instrumental, or Hybrid?7
The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox5
Towards a Realist Shifty Semantic Account of Moral Vagueness4
Computational Approaches to Concepts Representation: A Whirlwind Tour3
Truth-Ratios, Evidential Fit, and Deferring to Informants with Low Error Probabilities3
A Panpsychist Solution to the Exclusion Problem3
The Epistemic Benefits of Ideological Diversity3
Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism3
Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer2
Representational Solution to the Messenger-Shooting Objection2
Defending Pure Moral Deference: an Argument from Rationality2
The Morality and Aesthetics of Personal Beauty2
Antipathy as an Emotion2
Applying Alex Broadbent’s Reverse Counterfactual Theory to the Outbreak of World War I: A Novel Causal Analysis2
Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism1
A Plea for Commonality Thesis1
Descartes vs. the Scholastics: Lessons from Contemporary Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience1
Causality and Reliability1
Progress in Understanding Consciousness? Easy and Hard Problems, and Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives1
The Classic Inherence Theory of Attributes: Its Theses and Their Errors1
Epistemic Bystander1
Della Rocca’s Relations Regress and Bradley’s Relations Regresses1
Relativism and Intracultural Conflict1
On Semantic and Ontic Truth1
The Principle of Total Evidence: Justification and Political Significance1
Deontic Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem1
Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument1
Why Be Rational?1
Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation1
Associative Inferential Transitions, or One Problem with Siegel’s Response Hypothesis1
Epistemic Luck and Knowledge1
The Gruesome Truth About Semantic Dispositionalism1
Causation in Physics and in Physicalism1
Explaining Higher-order Defeat1
On Whether It Is and What It Is1
We Can Defend Normative Error Theory1
Correction to: Carroll’s Regress Times Three1
Sensitivity: Checking into Knowing?1
Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind1
Deduction, Abduction, and Creativity1
Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and KK-Failure0
The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance0
The Absurdity of Pannormism0
Checking and the Argument from Inquiry0
How Long Does a Time Last?0
A Remark on the Bank Cases0
An Ultimate Argument Against Nominalistic Relationalism0
Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?0
Knowing What One Likes: Epistemicist Solution to Faultless Disagreement0
Naïve Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument0
Scientific Understanding: No Veritism Without Realism, No Realism Without Veritism0
Value Pluralism versus Value Monism0
From Metaphysics to Methods?: Pluralism in Cancer Research0
Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases0
Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox0
Panpsychist Perspectives on Free Will: Compatibilism and Libertarianism, and Constitutive and Non-constitutive Panpsychism0
Evidential Incognizance0
Dead Past, Ad hocness, and Zombies0
De re Necessity and de se Intention: Defending a Further Restricted Essential Indexical Thesis0
Do Corporations Deserve Moral Consideration?0
Metaethics as Therapy0
The Subset View of Realization and the Part-Whole Problem0
Knowledge as a Social Kind0
Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms0
Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation0
Communication Without Shared Meanings0
Moral Generalizations and Moral Explanatory Pluralism0
Lost Disagreement: On Predicates of Personal Taste and the Superiority Approach0
Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism0
Pragmatic Encroachment Defended: A Response to Wolfgang Barz0
Identity Theory and Falsifiability0
How Seemings Resolve Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism0
Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility0
Existence Is Not Relativistically Invariant—Part 1: Meta-ontology0
Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck0
For the Sake of Knowledge: The Epistemic Value of Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues0
Fair Countable Lotteries and Reflection0
Rational Inconsistency Against Non-skeptical Infallibilism0
Is There a Disappearing Agent Problem for Agent Causalists?0
What is Existence? A Matter of Co(n)text0
Taming Holism: an Inferentialist Account of Communication0
Many Bombers of the Principle of Double Effect: An Analysis of Strategic/Terror Bomber Thought Experiment Variants0
Musical Types and Musical Flexibility0
Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification0
On the Cardinality Argument Against Quidditism0
Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?0
How the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotions Can Account for Valence and Irrationality: Reply to Objections0
Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism0
Essentialist Arguments for Discernibility are Unsound0
Timeless Causation?0
Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge0
False Authorities0
Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach0
Truthmaker Semantics, Disjunction, and Fundamentals0
Even Bigger-Picture Causalism0
Common Ground and Charity in Conflict0
Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument0
Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution0
ACT-Endorsing Libertarianism, Constitutive Luck, and Basic Moral Responsibility0
Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution0
Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action0
Composition as Trans-Scalar Identity0
A Problem in Standard Presentations of the Mere Addition Paradox0
Qualification in Philosophy0
On Functional Plurality: A Taxonomy of Benign and Problematic Functions0
Truth and Knowledge in F. P. Ramsey’s Essays: a Pragmatic Overview0
Avoiding Strawson’s Crude Opposition: How to Straddle the Participant and Objective Stances0
Moral Responsibility in a Vat0
Partially Autonomous Belief0
Relationism and the Problem of Order0
The Cogito, Dreamt Characters, and Unreal Existence0
Checking out Checking0
What the Remnant Person Problem Really Implies0
Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction0
Doxastic Precautionary Principle as Political Encroachment0
Introduction to the Special Issue0
On Wittgenstein’s Dispensation with “ = ” in the Tractatus and its Philosophical Background. A Critical Study0
What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories0
Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge0
Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism0
Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals0
Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective0
Mereological Anti-Conservatism0
Why Contingentist Actualists Should Endorse the Barcan Formula0
Norms of Constatives0
Reasoning with maps, a dynamic approach0
Beyond Impossibility0
Justified Evidence Resistance0
A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments0
Suspension of Judgment, Non-additivity, and Additivity of Possibilities0
Scientific Realism vs. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Critical Rationalist Approach0
Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities0
Fragmentalism and Tensed Truths0
Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms0
A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism0
What’s Wrong With Swearing?0
Moral Enhancement Is Irrational0
The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism0
Deflating Predicativism Against the Small Clause Hypothesis for Proper Names0
The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion0
Intention, Action, and De Se Indexicality0
Analytic Epistemology and Armchair Psychology0
Necessary Facts0
In Defense of Parfit’s Ontology0
Carnap and Quine on Explanationism in Ontology0
The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism0
Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic0
Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion0
On the Factivity Problem for Contextualism0
A Note on Knowing and Checking0
Carroll’s Regress Times Three0
Sensitivity Unmotivated0
Social Epistemology and Epidemiology0
Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough0
Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions0
The No-Content View of Contradictions0
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