Games and Economic Behavior

Papers
(The median citation count of Games and Economic Behavior is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-05-01 to 2026-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games63
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions51
Policy gambles and valence in elections34
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance32
Beyond uncertainty aversion24
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses23
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers21
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs20
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation19
Editorial Board19
Continuous level-k mechanism design19
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality16
Mechanism design with informational punishment15
Grouping agents with persistent types14
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence14
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value13
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets13
Success functions in large contests13
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms13
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information12
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market12
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles12
Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics12
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites12
No trade under verifiable information11
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design11
Editorial Board11
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game11
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria11
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency10
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence10
Partial credence goods on review platforms10
Editorial Board10
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games10
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments10
Editorial Board10
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players10
Communication between unbiased agents10
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation9
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies9
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction9
Belief formation under signal correlation9
Efficient matching under general constraints8
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis8
A theory of progressive lending8
Unfounded opinion's curse8
Information flows and memory in games8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints8
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design8
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up8
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information8
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information8
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance8
Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms8
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms7
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement7
Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation7
Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks7
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership7
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition7
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study7
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result7
Pricing and information acquisition in networks7
Social learning among opinion leaders7
Competition with list prices7
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting7
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains7
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games7
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report7
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma7
Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information7
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior7
Learning in unprofitable games7
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma6
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets6
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains6
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games6
Reputation-based persuasion platforms6
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness6
Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences6
Strategic ambiguity in global games6
Editorial Board6
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values6
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks6
Aggregating inconclusive data sets6
Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers6
Editorial Board6
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information6
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information6
Editorial Board6
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation6
Revealed preference domains from random choice5
Gradual matching with affirmative action5
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment5
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores5
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies5
On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism5
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors5
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing5
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences5
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma5
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs5
Minimal stable voting rules5
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result5
The secretary recommendation problem5
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market5
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games5
Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices5
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making5
Stable constitutions5
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time5
Polarizing persuasion5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings5
Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment5
Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes4
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values4
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers4
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy4
The topology of poker4
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace4
Propaganda and conflict4
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules4
Buying winners4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems4
Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents4
Ideological consistency and valence4
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement4
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints4
Towards data auctions with externalities4
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion4
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence4
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests4
Editorial Board4
Evolution and the ultimatum game4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism4
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence4
Local public good equilibrium4
Editorial Board4
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework4
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality4
Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections4
Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems4
Issue linkage4
Editorial Board4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform4
Editorial Board4
Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice4
Signaling motives in lying games4
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources4
Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching4
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game4
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation4
Editorial Board4
Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries4
Bargaining with binary private information4
School choice with transferable student characteristics4
Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities3
On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria3
Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification3
Stability vs. no justified envy3
Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games3
Understanding dynamic interactions3
Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents3
Efficient public good provision between and within groups3
Stable sharing3
A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets3
Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks3
Editorial Board3
Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments3
Entry under placement uncertainty3
Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles3
Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games3
Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment3
BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design3
Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities3
Rationalizing sharing rules3
Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?3
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods3
Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown3
Simple equilibria in general contests3
Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem3
Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences3
Fair division with subjective divisibility3
To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games3
The limits of identification in discrete choice3
Editorial Board3
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates3
Scheduling games with rank-based utilities3
Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions3
Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment3
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences3
Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics3
The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints3
Learning through period and physical time3
“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment3
Editorial Board3
Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge3
Privately designed correlated equilibrium3
Matching with transfers under distributional constraints3
Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection3
Taming selten's horse with impulse response3
Public goods games in directed networks3
A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence3
Corrigendum to “Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information” [Games Econ. Behav. 129 (2021) 350–369]3
Second-best probability weighting3
Optimal grading contests3
Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers3
Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment3
Choice structures in games2
Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game2
Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games2
Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading2
Editorial Board2
Fairness for multi-self agents2
The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior2
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems2
Editorial Board2
Lying in persuasion2
A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence2
Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations2
School choice with preference rank classes2
Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap2
Bicriteria Nash flows over time2
Duality in financial networks2
A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain2
Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences2
Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes2
Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum2
Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games2
Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities2
Information avoidance in school choice2
Bayesian stable states2
Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods2
Present-bias and the value of sophistication: Splurging vs. smoothing2
Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods2
Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market2
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