Games and Economic Behavior

Article	Citations
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms	145
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games	53
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions	33
Policy gambles and valence in elections	31
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria	28
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance	28
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs	20
Beyond uncertainty aversion	20
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses	19
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence	17
Grouping agents with persistent types	17
Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data	16
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information	16
Mechanism design with informational punishment	16
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles	15
Editorial Board	15
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market	15
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality	15
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets	13
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation	13
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers	13
Continuous level-k mechanism design	13
Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions	13
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value	12
Editorial Board	12

The development gap in economic rationality of future elites	12
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments	11
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation	11
Partial credence goods on review platforms	11
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game	11
No trade under verifiable information	11
Communication between unbiased agents	11
Editorial Board	10
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency	10
Belief formation under signal correlation	10
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction	10
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design	10
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games	10
Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options	10
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players	10
Efficient matching under general constraints	10
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence	10
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies	10
Editorial Board	10
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up	10
Cheap talk with private signal structures	10
Local public goods with weighted link formation	9
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information	9
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis	9
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information	9
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study	9
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior	8
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains	8
Pricing and information acquisition in networks	8
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance	8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints	8
A theory of progressive lending	8
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design	8
Information flows and memory in games	8
Social learning among opinion leaders	7
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments	7
Learning in unprofitable games	7
Editorial Board	7
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms	7
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership	7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition	7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information	7
Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks	7
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result	7
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report	7
Strategic ambiguity in global games	7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting	7
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach	7
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games	7
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement	7

The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma	7
Competition with list prices	7
Games with second-order expected utility	6
Reputation-based persuasion platforms	6
Editorial Board	6
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets	6
Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers	6
How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature	6
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games	6
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains	6
Editorial Board	6
A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem	6
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values	6
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information	6
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation	6
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information	6
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma	6
Minimal stable voting rules	5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games	5
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors	5
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks	5
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers	5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment	5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing	5
Polarizing persuasion	5
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation	5
Monotone persuasion	5
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making	5
Revealed preference domains from random choice	5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings	5
Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring	5
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust	5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty	5
The secretary recommendation problem	5
Stable constitutions	5
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences	5
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment	5
Gradual matching with affirmative action	5
Editorial Board	5
Contract design with socially attentive preferences	5
Aggregating inconclusive data sets	5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market	5
Observation delays in teams and effort cycles	5
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies	5
Full farsighted rationality	5
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice	5
Evolution and the ultimatum game	4
Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts	4
Bargaining with binary private information	4
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule	4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment	4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism	4
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs	4
Editorial Board	4
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources	4
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints	4
Entry under placement uncertainty	4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation	4
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion	4
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework	4
Buying winners	4
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules	4
Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets	4
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values	4
Editorial Board	4
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace	4
Editorial Board	4
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game	4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement	4
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores	4
Inductive inference with incompleteness	4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence	4
Optimal grading contests	4
Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives	4
Towards data auctions with externalities	4
Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy	4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents	4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems	4
Issue linkage	4
Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo	4

Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity	4
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests	4
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma	4
Ideological consistency and valence	4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance	4
Local public good equilibrium	4
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time	4
Propaganda and conflict	4
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality	4
Editorial Board	4
Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections	4
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence	4
The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices	4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform	4
Signaling motives in lying games	4
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers	4
Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments	3
Stable sharing	3
Robust coalitional implementation	3
Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes	3
Fair division with subjective divisibility	3
Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities	3
Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining	3
Stability vs. no justified envy	3
Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences	3
Efficient public good provision between and within groups	3
The limits of identification in discrete choice	3
Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities	3
Editorial Board	3
The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints	3
Corrigendum to “Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information” [Games Econ. Behav. 129 (2021) 350–369]	3
Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games	3
Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing	3
A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence	3
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy	3
College admissions with tuition transfers	3
Second-best probability weighting	3
Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection	3
Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics	3
Matching with transfers under distributional constraints	3
Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems	3
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results	3
Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives	3
Editorial Board	3
Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions	3
Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers	3
To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games	3
Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification	3
Do people maximize quantiles?	3
Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment	3
Public goods games in directed networks	3
Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem	3
Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices	3
Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections	3
The Trembling Chairman Paradox	3
Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown	3
Scheduling games with rank-based utilities	3
Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?	3
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates	3
Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects	3
“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment	3
Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles	3
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods	3
Understanding dynamic interactions	3
Editorial Board	3
Taming selten's horse with impulse response	3
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences	3
Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment	3
Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents	3
Simple equilibria in general contests	3
Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks	3
The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions	3
Editorial Board	3
School choice with transferable student characteristics	3
On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria	3
Bayesian stable states	2
Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition	2
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems	2
Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap	2
Fairness for multi-self agents	2
Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival	2
Leadership ability and agenda choice	2
Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game	2
Corrigendum to “School choice with costly information Acquisition” [Games and Economic Behavior Volume 143 (2024) 248-268]	2
Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games	2
Editorial Board	2
Advisors with hidden motives	2
Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods	2
Can threats improve payoffs from bargaining in markets with retaliations? Evidence from a field experiment	2
Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers	2
A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain	2
The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior	2
Bicriteria Nash flows over time	2
A note on topological aspects in dynamic games of resource extraction and economic growth theory	2
Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction	2