Games and Economic Behavior

Papers
(The TQCC of Games and Economic Behavior is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-06-01 to 2026-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games62
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions51
Policy gambles and valence in elections25
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance23
Beyond uncertainty aversion22
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers21
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation20
Editorial Board19
Continuous level-k mechanism design19
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality16
Grouping agents with persistent types15
Success functions in large contests14
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets14
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms13
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs13
Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics13
Mechanism design with informational punishment13
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence12
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria12
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses12
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information12
Editorial Board11
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles11
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game11
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market11
No trade under verifiable information11
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites11
Belief formation under signal correlation10
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players10
Editorial Board10
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies10
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency10
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design10
Editorial Board10
Communication between unbiased agents10
Partial credence goods on review platforms9
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games9
Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry9
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments9
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence9
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction8
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information8
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up8
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information8
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis8
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance8
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation8
Information flows and memory in games8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints8
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains7
Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms7
Unfounded opinion's curse7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting7
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach7
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games7
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior7
A simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments7
A theory of progressive lending7
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study7
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments7
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition7
Authority measure for opinion dynamics7
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design7
Efficient matching under general constraints7
Competition with list prices7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information7
Learning in unprofitable games7
Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs6
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report6
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma6
Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games6
Editorial Board6
Editorial Board6
Social learning among opinion leaders6
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement6
Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation6
Lucky but confident –The effect of confidence on meritocratic beliefs and preferences for redistribution6
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains6
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information6
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result6
Pricing and information acquisition in networks6
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms6
Strategic ambiguity in global games6
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values6
Gradual matching with affirmative action5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment5
Editorial Board5
Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences5
A model of participatory persuasion5
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma5
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets5
Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment5
Revealed preference domains from random choice5
The secretary recommendation problem5
On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism5
Aggregating inconclusive data sets5
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty5
Reputation-based persuasion platforms5
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market5
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust5
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences5
Eliciting and distinguishing between weak and incomplete preferences: Theory, experiment and computation5
Potentials in social environments5
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness5
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games5
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers5
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing5
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time5
Polarizing persuasion5
Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries4
Issue linkage4
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule4
The topology of poker4
Stable constitutions4
Propaganda and conflict4
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs4
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies4
The case for lobbying transparency4
Local public good equilibrium4
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma4
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace4
Evolution and the ultimatum game4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation4
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence4
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment4
Editorial Board4
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making4
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores4
Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching4
The effect of exit rights on cost-based procurement contracts4
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence4
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests4
Editorial Board4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems4
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity4
Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices4
Editorial Board4
Editorial Board4
Signaling motives in lying games4
Minimal stable voting rules4
Buying winners4
Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment4
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result4
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games4
Bureaucratic Norms and Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform4
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement4
Ideological consistency and valence4
Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment3
Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification3
Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games3
Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles3
Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics3
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality3
Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem3
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers3
Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks3
Towards data auctions with externalities3
Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?3
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game3
Taming selten's horse with impulse response3
Second-best probability weighting3
Motives for Delegating Financial Decisions3
Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents3
Editorial Board3
Optimal grading contests3
Competing for influence in networks through strategic targeting3
BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design3
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy3
Scheduling games with rank-based utilities3
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion3
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints3
Stable sharing3
The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests3
Editorial Board3
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources3
“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment3
Compellingness in Nash implementation3
Fair division with subjective divisibility3
Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments3
School choice with transferable student characteristics3
The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints3
Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions3
Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities3
Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections3
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results3
Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes3
Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems3
On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria3
Editorial Board3
Matching with transfers under distributional constraints3
Bargaining with binary private information3
Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown3
Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice3
Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge3
A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence3
The limits of identification in discrete choice3
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates3
Entry under placement uncertainty3
Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment3
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