Games and Economic Behavior

Papers
(The TQCC of Games and Economic Behavior is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-08-01 to 2025-08-01.)
ArticleCitations
Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data137
Editorial Board47
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation31
Continuous level-k mechanism design29
Editorial Board24
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games23
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets19
Model-based evaluation of cooling-off policies19
Mechanism design with informational punishment16
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs15
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality15
Grouping agents with persistent types15
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles15
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value14
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information14
Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions14
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites13
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence13
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market13
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms12
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions12
Editorial Board12
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses12
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers12
Editorial Board12
Beyond uncertainty aversion12
Communication between unbiased agents11
Editorial Board11
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design10
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies10
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games10
Partial credence goods on review platforms10
Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options10
Belief formation under signal correlation10
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence10
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments10
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game10
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency10
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players10
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation10
Information flows and memory in games9
A theory of progressive lending9
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains9
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study9
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction9
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up9
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information9
Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors9
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance9
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis9
Local public goods with weighted link formation8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints8
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design8
Efficient matching under general constraints8
Cheap talk with private signal structures8
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information8
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior7
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership7
A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games7
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result7
Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks7
Editorial Board7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting7
Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information7
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report7
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms7
Competition with list prices7
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments7
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition7
How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature6
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values6
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma6
Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study6
Editorial Board6
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets6
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains6
Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms6
Learning in unprofitable games6
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games6
Strategic ambiguity in global games6
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information6
Reputation-based persuasion platforms6
Editorial Board6
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement6
Editorial Board6
Games with second-order expected utility6
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences5
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs5
The secretary recommendation problem5
Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment5
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information5
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty5
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice5
Polarizing persuasion5
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games5
Aggregating inconclusive data sets5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market5
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors5
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks5
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma5
Contract design with socially attentive preferences5
A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem5
Monotone persuasion5
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation5
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies5
Full farsighted rationality5
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings5
Editorial Board5
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games5
Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers5
Observation delays in teams and effort cycles5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing5
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust5
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity4
Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems4
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game4
Screening by mode of trade4
Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets4
Editorial Board4
MINIMAL STABLE VOTING RULES4
Inductive inference with incompleteness4
Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts4
Signaling motives in lying games4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence4
Issue linkage4
Local public good equilibrium4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement4
Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives4
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework4
Proxy Variables and Feedback Effects in Decision Making4
Pricing with bargain hunting consumers4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation4
Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment4
Editorial Board4
Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism4
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma4
The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices4
Revealed preference domains from random choice4
Stable constitutions4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform4
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints3
A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence3
Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems3
Robust coalitional implementation3
Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining3
Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown3
Scheduling games with rank-based utilities3
Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents3
Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects3
Ideological consistency and valence3
Towards data auctions with externalities3
Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities3
Evolution and the ultimatum game3
On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria3
The limits of identification in discrete choice3
Editorial Board3
Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification3
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results3
Editorial Board3
Rollover risk and stress test credibility3
School choice with transferable student characteristics3
Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections3
Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles3
Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics3
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers3
College admissions with tuition transfers3
The Trembling Chairman Paradox3
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules3
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace3
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values3
Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment3
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests3
Fair division with subjective divisibility3
Taming selten's horse with impulse response3
Optimal grading contests3
Matching with transfers under distributional constraints3
Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection3
Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments3
Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem3
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality3
Second-best probability weighting3
Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions3
Gender stereotypes in deliberation and team decisions3
Entry under placement uncertainty3
Preemption with a second-mover advantage3
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources3
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion3
Bargaining with binary private information3
Corrigendum to “Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information” [Games Econ. Behav. 129 (2021) 350–369]3
Buying winners3
The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints3
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy3
Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks3
Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games3
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence3
Stable sharing3
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