Games and Economic Behavior

Papers
(The TQCC of Games and Economic Behavior is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-04-01 to 2025-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation119
Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies41
Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences27
Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games19
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers19
What makes an opinion leader: Expertise vs popularity16
Screening while controlling an externality15
Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms14
Editorial Board13
Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams13
Editorial Board13
A model of gradual information disclosure13
Editorial Board12
The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions12
Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions12
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time12
Continuous level-k mechanism design11
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence11
Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games11
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms11
Multi-dimensional reasoning in competitive resource allocation games: Evidence from intra-team communication10
Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities10
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences10
Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments10
Editorial Board9
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores9
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market9
Position auctions with multi-unit demands8
Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship8
Noisy persuasion8
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value8
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites8
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation8
The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types8
Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation7
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses7
Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory7
Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data7
Editorial Board7
Pledge-and-review in the laboratory7
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice7
An experiment on network density and sequential learning7
Projection bias in effort choices7
Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives7
Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness7
Monotone persuasion7
Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee6
Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time6
Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis6
Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games6
On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests6
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets6
Full farsighted rationality6
Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points6
Epistemological implementation of social choice functions6
The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment6
Measuring socially appropriate social preferences6
Model-based evaluation of cooling-off policies6
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation6
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets6
Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem6
On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation6
Fair division with two-sided preferences6
Reviews and Comments5
Mechanism design with informational punishment5
Signal-jamming in the frequency domain5
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions5
Revealed preference domains from random choice5
Editorial Board5
Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation5
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games5
Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints5
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality5
Learning through period and physical time5
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs5
Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks5
Myopic oligopoly pricing5
Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines5
Editorial Board5
Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: Approvals can be harder than strict preferences5
The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games5
Understanding dynamic interactions5
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information5
Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs5
Beyond uncertainty aversion5
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions5
Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations5
Stability of alliance networks5
Pricing with bargain hunting consumers5
The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle5
Status quo bias with choice overload5
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles5
Stability vs. no justified envy5
Popular matchings with weighted voters5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games5
Reselling information4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation4
Editorial Board4
Electoral accountability in the lab4
An undecidable statement regarding zero-sum games4
Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment4
Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics4
Deterrence in networks4
Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function4
2020 reviewer acknowledgment4
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation4
Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading4
Local public good equilibrium4
Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions4
A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices4
Endogenous network formation in local public goods: An experimental analysis4
Accountability in Markovian Elections4
Designing weighted and directed networks under complementarities4
Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games4
Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual4
Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies4
A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games4
Limited Foresight Equilibrium4
Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study4
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players4
Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers4
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs4
Stable constitutions4
Temptation and guilt4
Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests”4
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem4
Corrigendum to “Social learning in nonatomic routing games” [Games Econ. Behav. 132 (2022) 221–233]4
Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium3
Stable cores in information graph games3
Editorial Board3
Editorial Board3
Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading3
Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options3
De-biasing strategic communication3
Editorial Board3
Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing3
Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market3
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies3
Editorial Board3
When are groups less moral than individuals?3
Communication between unbiased agents3
Auctions with flexible information acquisition3
Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales3
Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism3
On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge3
Inductive inference with incompleteness3
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence3
Buying supermajorities in the lab3
Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: Theory and evidence3
Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives3
The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices3
Editorial Board3
Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition3
An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation3
Multi-activity influence and intervention3
Stochastic replicator dynamics: A theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment3
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency3
Editorial Board3
Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity3
On the manipulability of equitable voting rules3
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework3
The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity3
Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?3
Issue selection, media competition, and polarization of salience3
Screening by mode of trade3
Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy3
Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes3
Editorial Board3
Two-sided strategic information transmission3
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma3
Editorial Board3
Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality3
Influencing a polarized and connected legislature3
Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive3
Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality3
Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets3
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