Games and Economic Behavior

Papers
(The TQCC of Games and Economic Behavior is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-11-01 to 2025-11-01.)
ArticleCitations
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms145
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games53
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions33
Policy gambles and valence in elections31
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance28
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria28
Beyond uncertainty aversion20
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs20
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses19
Grouping agents with persistent types17
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence17
Mechanism design with informational punishment16
Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data16
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information16
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality15
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles15
Editorial Board15
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market15
Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions13
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets13
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation13
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers13
Continuous level-k mechanism design13
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites12
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value12
Editorial Board12
No trade under verifiable information11
Communication between unbiased agents11
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments11
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation11
Partial credence goods on review platforms11
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game11
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence10
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies10
Editorial Board10
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up10
Cheap talk with private signal structures10
Editorial Board10
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency10
Belief formation under signal correlation10
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction10
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design10
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games10
Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options10
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players10
Efficient matching under general constraints10
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study9
Local public goods with weighted link formation9
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information9
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis9
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information9
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design8
Information flows and memory in games8
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior8
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains8
Pricing and information acquisition in networks8
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints8
A theory of progressive lending8
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting7
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach7
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games7
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement7
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma7
Competition with list prices7
Social learning among opinion leaders7
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments7
Learning in unprofitable games7
Editorial Board7
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms7
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information7
Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks7
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result7
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report7
Strategic ambiguity in global games7
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values6
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation6
Editorial Board6
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma6
Games with second-order expected utility6
Reputation-based persuasion platforms6
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains6
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets6
Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers6
How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature6
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games6
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information6
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information6
Editorial Board6
A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem6
Minimal stable voting rules5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games5
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors5
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks5
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing5
Polarizing persuasion5
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation5
Monotone persuasion5
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making5
Revealed preference domains from random choice5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings5
Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring5
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty5
The secretary recommendation problem5
Stable constitutions5
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences5
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment5
Gradual matching with affirmative action5
Editorial Board5
Contract design with socially attentive preferences5
Aggregating inconclusive data sets5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market5
Observation delays in teams and effort cycles5
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies5
Full farsighted rationality5
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice5
Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts4
Evolution and the ultimatum game4
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule4
Bargaining with binary private information4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment4
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs4
Editorial Board4
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources4
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints4
Entry under placement uncertainty4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation4
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion4
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework4
Buying winners4
Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets4
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules4
Editorial Board4
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values4
Editorial Board4
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement4
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game4
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores4
Inductive inference with incompleteness4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence4
Optimal grading contests4
Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives4
Towards data auctions with externalities4
Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems4
Issue linkage4
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity4
Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo4
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma4
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance4
Ideological consistency and valence4
Local public good equilibrium4
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time4
Propaganda and conflict4
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality4
Editorial Board4
Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections4
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence4
The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform4
Signaling motives in lying games4
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers4
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