Utilitas

Papers
(The median citation count of Utilitas is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-08-01 to 2026-08-01.)
ArticleCitations
A Philosophical Metabolism Problem: Undermining of Egoistic Reasons11
Garrett Cullity, Concern, Respect, and Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 326.10
Harm-Benefit Analysis for Animal Experiments Is Not Utilitarian10
A Letter from the New Editor10
Egalitarianism across Generations8
Degrees and Demands6
Family and Moderation in Locke’s State of Nature4
Precious Goods4
Troubled Hedonism and Social Justice: Mill and the Epicureans on the Ataraxic Life4
Jeanine M. Grenberg, Kant’s Deontological Eudaemonism: The Dutiful Pursuit of Virtue and Happiness (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xii + 414.3
Superiority Discounting Implies the Preposterous Conclusion3
UTI volume 34 issue 4 Cover and Back matter3
Roger Crisp, Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-Interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2019), pp. x + 233.3
John Stuart Mill's Passage on Pimps and the Limits on Free Speech3
Michael Quinn, Bentham (Cambridge and Medford: Polity Press, 2022), pp. x + 218.3
What Is the Point of a Duty of Beneficence? Reevaluating Taurek2
The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure2
Mill’s Aesthetic Action: A Reconceptualization as World-Regarding Action2
Tim Mulgan , Philosophy for an Ending World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. xxxiv + 292.2
Three Forms of Actualist Direct Consequentialism2
Absolute Fairness and Weighted Lotteries2
Some Acts Really Harm: A Defense of the Standard Account versus Norcross's Contextualism2
Shelly Kagan, Answering Moral Skepticism (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. xiv + 392.2
Trivially Satisfied Desires: A Problem for Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Well-Being2
A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism2
A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem2
Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires2
Longtermism, Technology, and Well-Being2
How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?1
The Disjunctive Repugnant Conclusion1
Harm, Failing to Benefit, and the Counterfactual Comparative Account1
The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey1
Bigoted Insults, Harm, and the Intentional Infliction of Pain: A Reply to Bell1
Minds Matter1
Helen McCabe, John Stuart Mill, Socialist (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021), pp. 368.1
Moral Significance and Overpermissiveness1
Should the Numbers Count for Taurek?1
Rule Consequentialism and Demandingness: The Wrong Solution(s)?1
Sidgwick’s Critique of Deontology: Scrupulous Fairness or Serpent-Windings?1
In Defence of Pigou–Dalton for Chances1
Enduring Objections to Actual Rule Consequentialism1
From Trust to Corporate Agency: An Argument in Social Ontology1
Douglas Portmore, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xvii + 324.1
Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues1
Ben Bramble & James Lenman, Should We Maximize Utility? A Debate about Utilitarianism (Abingdon, Routledge, 2025), pp. xviii + 224.1
Dead Sea Apple Cases of Disappointment1
David Boonin, Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 209.1
Partial Aggregation for Prioritarians1
Thomas E. Hill Jr., Beyond Duty: Kantian Ideals of Respect, Beneficence, and Appreciation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. xii + 319.1
The Function of Hypocrisy Norms0
Bentham’s Laws in Principem and his Command Theory: a Critique of Hart’s Criticisms0
Alastair Norcross, Morality by Degrees: Reasons without Demands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. vii + 157.0
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, The Value Gap (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xv + 215.0
How Relationships Mitigate Paternalistic Complaints (When They Do)0
Ending Print Publication After December 2022 Issue0
Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation0
Can Vegans Eat Dessert?0
Does the Patterned View Avoid the Ideal Worlds Objection?0
Egyptians, Aliens, and Okies: Against the Sum of Averages0
The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming0
How Thresholds Matter: On the Bounds and Demands of Justice0
Is Piecework a Private Concern? A Reply to Riley0
Psychological Egoism and Ought-Implies-Can: What Do They Entail?0
Is Norcross Right about Right?0
Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem0
Self-Respect Paternalism0
Larry Temkin, Being Good in a World of Need (Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xxxi + 388.0
Bodily Appearance, Respect for Persons, and Protecting the Vulnerable0
Counterfactual Persons and the Argument Against Abortion: Reply to Kulesa0
From Contextualism to Contrastivism in Moral Theory0
Intuition and Kagan's Hierarchicalism0
The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion0
Non-Conceptual Normative Pluralism and the Dualism of Practical Reason0
Bentham's Mugging0
James E. Crimmins, Utilitarianism in the Early American Republic (New York: Routledge, 2022), pp. 280.0
The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living: On Boonin's Solution to the Non-Identity Problem0
Intergenerational Justice and Freedom from Deprivation0
Two Dogmas of Population Ethics: MacAskill’s Existentially Unrestricted Form of Longtermism and the Value of Existence0
When is Forgone Value Proportionate?0
An Unwelcome Implication for Omnivores?0
The Washout Argument against Longtermism0
Felt-Quality Hedonism, Alienation, and the Spirit of Resonance0
Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism0
Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023), pp. vi + 218.0
Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology0
The Sequence Argument Against the Procreation Asymmetry0
Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires0
Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth?0
Paul Hurley, Against the Tyranny of Outcomes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. xv + 1870
Climate Esoteric Morality and the Problem of Inconsequentialism0
Hilary Greaves, Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, Essays on Longtermism: Present Action for the Distant Future (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025), pp. 6080
Steve Clarke, Hazem Zohny, and Julian Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. xvii + 333.0
Better Never to Have Been, Better to Cease to Be?0
For the Greater Individual and Social Good: Justifying Age-Differentiated Paternalism0
Robert Audi and David Philips (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of W.D. Ross: Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Virtue, & Value (Oxford, OUP, 2025), pp. xii + 272.0
Catia Faria, Animal Ethics in the Wild: Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. ix + 222.0
John Peter DiIulio, Completely Free: The Moral and Political Vision of John Stuart Mill (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), pp. xiii + 305.0
The Dual Reason-Giving Force of Welfare: An Exploration0
When a Free Act Costs a Motive: Clearing Consequentialism of Conflict0
Harm, Context, Blame, and Significance: A Response to Eggleston, Sinnott-Armstrong, Mason, and Kagan0
Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable0
Principle, Pragmatism, and Piecework in On Liberty0
UTI volume 34 issue 3 Cover and Back matter0
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth0
Hidden Desires: A Unified Strategy for Defending the Desire-Satisfaction Theory0
Jeremy Bentham , Essays on Logic, Ethics, and Universal Grammar, Edited by Philip Schofield (London, UCL Press, 2025), pp. lxxvi + 519.0
Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Those Who Could Have Existed0
Samuel Scheffler, One Life to Lead: The Mysteries of Time and the Goods of Attachment. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. xi + 2510
A Millian Case against Epistemic Arguments for Federalism0
Philip Schofield, Tim Causer and Chris Riley (eds.), The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, Volume 14: Supplementary Letters (London: UCL Press, 2026) pp. xxiv + 701.0
Jeff Sebo, Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves: Why Animals Matter for Pandemics, Climate Change, and Other Catastrophes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xvii + 255.0
UTI volume 34 issue 3 Cover and Front matter0
The Parent Trap: Why Choice-Dependent Moral Theories Fail to Deliver the Asymmetry0
Structural Rationality in Desire0
William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist and Toby Ord, Moral Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. viii + 226.0
William MacAskill, What We Owe The Future: A Million-Year View (One World Publications, London, 2022), pp. 246.0
The Influence of Ancient Greek Moral Philosophy on Bentham’s Development of the Principle of Utility: “I Had It from Epicurus, from Carneades,…”0
The Sum of Averages: An Egyptology-Proof Average View0
Fit and Well-Being0
Josh Milburn, Food, Justice, and Animals: Feeding the World Respectfully (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 224.0
Indeterminacy in Global Warming: A Supervaluationist Response0
Pattern-Based Reasons and Disaster0
UTI volume 34 issue 4 Cover and Front matter0
M. A. Roberts, The Existence Puzzle: An Introduction to Population Axiology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. 280.0
Totalism, Animals, and the Repugnant Conclusion0
The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero0
Benatar and Beyond: Rethinking the Consequences of Asymmetry0
Compatibilism and Truly Minimal Morality0
Richard Yetter Chappell, Darius Meissner, William MacAskill, An Introduction to Utilitarianism. From Theory to Practice (Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 2025), pp. xii + 251.0
Trade, Piecework, and the Liberty Principle0
Bain's Theory of Moral Judgment and the Development of Mill's Utilitarianism0
Michael Pelczar, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. xiii + 210.0
Mark Fabian, A Theory of Subjective Wellbeing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. x + 305.0
Classic Hedonism Reconsidered0
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