Journal of Philosophical Research

Papers
(The TQCC of Journal of Philosophical Research is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-06-01 to 2025-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
Glasgow on Death's Badness and Radiant Value6
Epistemic Trust in the Age of Misinformation3
Socially-extended Critical and Sympathetic Support3
Pragmatic Analyses of Indispensability Arguments2
Hegel on the Universals of Indexicals2
Are Cultural Explanations for Racial Disparities Racist? in advance1
Political Normativity as Functional Normativity1
Empathy, Timeliness, and Virtuous Hearing1
Response to "Empathy, Timeliness, and Virtuous Hearing"1
Measure for Measure: Exploring the Virtues of Vice Epistemology1
Understanding Logical Evidence, With Lessons From The Paradoxes1
Engagement, Experience, and Value1
Death, Value, Gratitude, and Solace1
EVIDENTIALISM, RATIONAL DELIBERATION, AND THE BASING RELATION in advance0
Leibniz and the Status of Possible Worlds in advance0
Reimagining the Quality of Life0
Spinoza’s Special Distinctions in advance0
There Is Something to the Authority Thesis0
Précis of Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account0
On What We Owe in Attention0
Reply to Amy Flowerree0
The Critiques of Ethical Hedonism in advance0
Reply to Rik Peels0
Epistemic Character Damage and Normative Contextualism0
Precis of the Mismeasure of the Self0
Epistemic Normativity in Non-Ideal Worlds0
Perception, Justification, and Knowledge0
First-person Authority and Epistemic Injustice in advance0
Assessing the Structuralist Challenge to Vice Epistemology0
Locke on Freedom and Freemen in the Two Treatises of Government0
Précis of Epistemic Care: Vulnerability, Inquiry, and Social Epistemology0
8-Tracks, The Demands of Gratitude and Harmonious Stews0
Do All Interesting Experiences Add to the Quality of Life?0
Epistemic Virtues and Vices as Attitudes: Implications for Empirical Measures and Virtue Interventions0
Reply to Dalmiya0
Reply to Breno Santos0
POLARIZATION MEASUREMENT, FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY, AND POLITICAL MEANING in advance0
Proper Social and Epistemic Expectations In Speech Exchange: Reply to Goldberg0
Perception, Justification, and Philosophical Truths0
Descartes on the Unity of the Virtues0
Knowing Your Mind by Making Up Your Mind Without Changing Your Mind, Too Much0
The Role of Picturing In Sellars’s Practical Philosophy0
The Meaning of Music in Hegel0
Integrity, Genericity, and the Limits of Reasons in advance0
The Solace0
The Moral Significance of Agent-Regret in advance0
An Error Theory for Misanthropy in advance0
Comments on Glasgow, The Solace0
Still Pessimistic about First-Person Authority0
Reasoning and Perceptual Foundationalism0
Entitled to Attention? Cooperativity, Context, and Standing0
Unlucky on Twin Earth0
Cruelty, Sadism, and the Joy of Inflicting Pain for its Own Sake0
Must Love Arise Naturally? in advance0
Trust, Inquiry and Partiality: Comments on Goldberg’s Conversational Pressure0
Reply to Charity Anderson0
Reliability, Accessibility, and Justified Credence0
Precis of Conversational Pressure0
The Problem of Political Normativity Understood as Functional Normativity in advance0
Does Knowledge Entail Justifications?0
Interesting Experiences0
Replies to Vrinda Dalmiya and Stacey McElroy-Heltzel0
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