Philosophical Explorations

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophical Explorations is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-04-01 to 2025-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept22
The mental in intentional action13
Correspondence and dispositional relations13
Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa8
The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker6
My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash6
Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement5
How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?5
Self-induced moral incapacity, collective responsibility, and attributability5
Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β)4
Narrative negotiation of personal identity4
Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations4
Action just is knowledge4
Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity4
Mental illness, exemption & moral exclusion: the role of interpretative generosity3
Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity3
Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them3
Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation3
Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties3
Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death3
Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity3
Deontic artifacts. Investigating the normativity of objects3
Self-control in action and belief3
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality2
Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability2
What is the relationship between grief and narrative?2
Blame: What is it good for?2
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction2
Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism2
The creativity of emotions2
Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites2
Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition2
Grief, self and narrative2
Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions1
Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology1
Why are people often rational? Saving the causal theory of action1
Acting for normative reasons and the correspondence relation1
Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance1
‘It was the illness talking’: self-illness ambiguity and metaphors’ functions in mental health narrative1
How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova1
Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery1
Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices1
How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?1
Fixing internalism about perceptual content1
Can realists reason with reasons?1
What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity1
From causation to conscious control1
Journey planning: a cartography of practical reasoning1
Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry1
Learning to walk and talk (again): what developmental psychology can teach us about online intersubjectivity1
On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration1
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception1
Implicit bias: a sin of omission?1
A moral freedom to which we might aspire1
Why severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand0
Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning0
Unavoidable actions0
A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’0
Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?0
Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding0
The guise of good reason0
See what I didn’t do there?0
Bringing transparency to the de se debates0
On the immediate mental antecedent of action0
Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’0
Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description0
Complete blockage Frankfurt examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities0
An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions0
Let me go and try0
Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?0
Are actions bodily movements?0
Empathy as a means to understand people0
What do my problems say about me?0
Empathising in online spaces0
Deciding: how special is it?0
Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances0
‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge0
Simulation trouble and gender trouble0
Skepticism about reasons for emotions0
Extending knowledge-how0
Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’0
Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy0
Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes0
The norm of reasoning0
What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?0
Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains0
Empathizing across sensibilities0
Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress0
Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist0
Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility0
On the fittingness of agential evaluations0
Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism0
Towards a theory of offense0
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency0
Life and meaning0
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy0
On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions0
Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice0
Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will0
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy0
Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach0
Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski0
Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept0
Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts0
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology0
On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action0
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies0
The modularity of the motor system0
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