OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Philosophical Explorations is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-01-01 to 2026-01-01.)

Article	Citations
Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites	37
Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions	20
Learning to walk and talk (again): what developmental psychology can teach us about online intersubjectivity	11
Empathy as a means to understand people	10
Inner speech: from self-knowledge to the second-person	10
Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility	10
Simulation trouble and gender trouble	9
On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action	8
What do my problems say about me?	7
Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?	7
Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’	7
Empathising in online spaces	6
Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity	6
Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa	6
Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β)	6
Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement	5
Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them	5
Should groups become self-interpreting agents?	5
My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash	5
The problem of fitting blame in addiction	4
Grief, self and narrative	4
What is the relationship between grief and narrative?	4
Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery	3
‘It was the illness talking’: self-illness ambiguity and metaphors’ functions in mental health narrative	3
Journey planning: a cartography of practical reasoning	3

Why are people often rational? Saving the causal theory of action	3
The norm of reasoning	3
Consciousness science and constitutive a priori principles: on the fundamental identity of integrated information theory	3
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies	3