Philosophical Issues

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophical Issues is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-12-01 to 2025-12-01.)
ArticleCitations
Libertarianism and agentive experience11
Reasons‐responsiveness, control and the negligence puzzle10
Determination from Above10
Freedom of thought8
8
Socio‐functional foundations in science: The case of measurement8
Group evidence6
How emotions grasp value6
Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths6
Epistemic control without voluntarism5
Trust as performance5
4
Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency13
Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths3
What do we do when we suspend judgement?3
Skepticism, naturalism, pyrrhonism3
Blaming the victim3
Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust13
Defeat and proficiencies3
Responsibility and iterated knowledge2
Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge2
Issue Information2
Zetetic supererogation2
The relational foundations of epistemic normativity2
Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame?2
Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist2
Freedom, foreknowledge, and betting1
List for Epistemology volume1
1
From responsibility to causation: The intransitivity of causation as a case study1
Collective and extended knowledge1
Outlaw epistemologies: Resisting the viciousness of country music's settler ignorance1
Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental11
Understanding friendship1
Epistemic bootstrapping as a failure to use an independent source1
Subjectivism and the morally conscientious person's concern to avoid acting wrongly1
Is moral understanding a kind of moral vision?1
Issue Information1
Issue Information1
Scaffolding knowledge1
Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness1
Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states1
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