Philosophical Issues

Papers
(The TQCC of Philosophical Issues is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-05-01 to 2024-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Concepts and predication from perception to cognition13
Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role6
Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame?5
The puzzle of the laws of appearance5
Trust as performance5
Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On Weisberg's puzzle for perceptual justification4
Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception4
Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited3
On the independence of belief and credence3
Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding3
Group evidence3
Evidential support and best explanations2
Belief as emotion2
Appearance and reality2
Public artifacts and the epistemology of collective material testimony2
Radical internalism2
Grounding legal proof2
Pragmatic encroachment and legal proof2
Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism1
Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist1
Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence1
Adam Marushak on the hypothetical given1
Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust11
Issue Information1
Toward a normative theory of parole grounded in agency1
Norms of criminal conviction1
Scaffolding knowledge1
Multisensory evidence1
A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge‐first1
Collective practical knowledge is a fragmented interrogative capacity1
Outlaw epistemologies: Resisting the viciousness of country music's settler ignorance1
Perception of continued existence unperceived1
Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt1
Rethinking the wrong of rape11
Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency11
Two dogmas of empirical justification1
Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat1
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