OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-06-01 to 2025-06-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	21
Informed intermediaries	21
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	17
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	15
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	15
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	13
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	12
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	11
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	11
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	11
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	11
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	11
Data and incentives	10
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	9
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	9
Choosing what to pay attention to	9
Value‐based distance between information structures	9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	8
Paying with information	8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	8
How to sell in a sequential auction market	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	8
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	8

Asset bubbles and product market competition	7
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	7
Statistical sunspots	7
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	7
When Walras meets Vickrey	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	6
Progressive participation	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Experimentation in organizations	4
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Subjective information choice processes	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	4
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	4
Boundedly rational demand	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	4
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	4
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
Stability in repeated matching markets	3
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	3
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	3
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	3
Rational bubbles and middlemen	3
Conveying value via categories	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Interview hoarding	3
∀ or ∃?	3
Gradual learning from incremental actions	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	3
Long information design	3
Bargaining with evolving private information	3

Slow persuasion	2
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	2
Dynamically stable matching	2
Time‐consistent fair social choice	2
Bayesian comparative statics	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	2
Strategic investment evaluation	2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	2
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	2
Correlated choice	2
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	2
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	2
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	2
The Dynamics of Instability	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	1
On bargaining norms as solutions to cost–minimization problems	1
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
Exploiting social influence in networks	1
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium	1
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	1
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	1
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent	1
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	1
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	1
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	1
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	1
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	1
Sufficientarianism	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
Efficient incentives with social preferences	1
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade	1
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	1