OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-04-01 to 2025-04-01.)

Article	Citations
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	16
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	14
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	14
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	13
Informed intermediaries	12
Asset bubbles and product market competition	11
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations	11
Robust performance evaluation of independent agents	9
Progressive participation	9
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	9
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	8
Exploiting social influence in networks	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	8
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	7
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	7
Long information design	6
Efficient incentives with social preferences	6
Which misspecifications persist?	6
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	6
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy	6
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	6
Statistical sunspots	6
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof	5

Bargaining with evolving private information	5
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning	5
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good	5
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	5
When Walras meets Vickrey	5
Rational bubbles and middlemen	5
Time‐consistent implementation in macroeconomic games	4
Surprise and default in general equilibrium	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	4
The implications of pricing on social learning	4
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	4
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers	4
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 4	4
Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	4
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 1	4
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	4
Information aggregation in Poisson elections	3
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	3
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	3
Loss aversion in sequential auctions	3
Interview hoarding	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	3
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
The property rights theory of production networks	3
Unrestricted information acquisition	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 1	3
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	3
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	3
Information design in multistage games	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
Dynamic economics with quantile preferences	2
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	2
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	2
Gradual learning from incremental actions	2
Sufficientarianism	2
Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution	2
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	2
The Dynamics of Instability	2
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	2
Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms	2
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	2
∀ or ∃?	2
Slow persuasion	2
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	2

Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice	1
Contracting over persistent information	1
Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network‐based comparisons	1
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs	1
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	1
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent	1
Subjective information choice processes	1
Collective hold‐up	1
Pair‐efficient reallocation of indivisible objects	1
Stability in repeated matching markets	1
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	1
On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators	1
Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice	1
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	1
Symmetric reduced‐form voting	1
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	1
Correlated choice	1
Auction design with data‐driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation	1
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	1
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	1
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	1
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	1
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
A theory of fair random allocation under priorities	1