OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-08-01 to 2025-08-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	23
Informed intermediaries	22
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	19
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	18
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	16
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	15
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	15
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	13
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	12
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	12
Data and incentives	11
Choosing what to pay attention to	11
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	11
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	11
Value‐based distance between information structures	10
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	10
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	9
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	9
Paying with information	9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	8
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	8
How to sell in a sequential auction market	8
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	8

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	8
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money	8
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	8
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing	8
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	7
Statistical sunspots	7
Progressive participation	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Asset bubbles and product market competition	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Optimal sequential contests	6
When Walras meets Vickrey	6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers	5
Subjective information choice processes	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	5
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	5
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	4
Conveying value via categories	4
Boundedly rational demand	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	4
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	4
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	4
Rational bubbles and middlemen	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
∀ or ∃?	3
Long information design	3
Bargaining with evolving private information	3
Gradual learning from incremental actions	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 2	3
Stability in repeated matching markets	3
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	3
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	3

Interview hoarding	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	3
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	2
Strategic investment evaluation	2
Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints	2
Random utility coordination games on networks	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
Bayesian comparative statics	2
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	2
Dynamically stable matching	2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	2
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	2
Slow persuasion	2
Correlated choice	2
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	2
Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack	2
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
Efficient incentives with social preferences	1
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium	1
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	1
Queueing to learn	1
Sufficientarianism	1
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	1
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	1
Exploiting social influence in networks	1
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	1
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade	1
Time‐consistent fair social choice	1
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	1
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	1
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	1
On bargaining norms as solutions to cost–minimization problems	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
The Dynamics of Instability	1
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	1
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	1
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	1
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	1
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	1