Theoretical Economics

Papers
(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-04-01 to 2024-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
Costly miscalibration22
Sequential persuasion21
A model of weighted network formation18
Convergence in models of misspecified learning14
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks12
Information aggregation in competitive markets12
Bounded rationality and limited data sets11
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard11
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility10
Censorship as optimal persuasion10
Experimentation in organizations10
Relational communication9
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance9
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets8
Dynamically stable matching8
Bayesian privacy8
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions8
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks7
Persuasion with unknown beliefs7
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes7
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems7
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling7
Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment6
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing6
Agendas in legislative decision‐making6
Communication with forgetful liars6
Revenue from matching platforms6
Rational bubbles and middlemen6
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run5
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions5
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs5
Long information design5
On selecting the right agent5
Slow persuasion5
Robust contracting under double moral hazard5
Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications5
Macro‐financial volatility under dispersed information5
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning5
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors4
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games4
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade4
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating4
Which misspecifications persist?4
Sustainable debt4
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima4
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers4
Information design in multistage games4
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations4
Statistical sunspots4
Chain stability in trading networks4
Delegating learning4
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting4
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