OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-09-01 to 2025-09-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	23
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	22
Informed intermediaries	22
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	18
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	18
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 3	16
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	15
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	15
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	12
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	12
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	12
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	11
Value‐based distance between information structures	11
Data and incentives	11
Choosing what to pay attention to	11
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	11
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	11
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	11
Paying with information	10
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	9
Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems	9
How to sell in a sequential auction market	9
Forward‐looking experimentation of correlated alternatives	9
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	9

On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	9
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	8
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money	8
Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts	8
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	7
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing	7
When Walras meets Vickrey	6
Asset bubbles and product market competition	6
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	6
Statistical sunspots	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Progressive participation	6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	5
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers	5
Optimal sequential contests	5
Attack and interception in networks	4
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	4
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Sensitivity versus size: Implications for tax competition	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	4
Subjective information choice processes	4
Boundedly rational demand	4