American Economic Journal-Microeconomics

Papers
(The TQCC of American Economic Journal-Microeconomics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-06-01 to 2026-06-01.)
ArticleCitations
Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction94
Fair Shares and Selective Attention36
Decreasing Impatience34
Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets24
Eliciting Time Preferences When Income and Consumption Vary: Theory, Validation, and Application to Job Search19
Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach18
Evaluating the Impact of Online Market Integration—Evidence from the EU Portable PC Market18
Severance Pay in an Optimal Contract16
Information Acquisition and Product Differentiation Perception15
Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions11
Consistent Depth of Reasoning in Level-k Models11
Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers10
The Inner Workings of a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel in the Automotive Fuel Industry10
Belief Elicitation When More Than Money Matters: Controlling for “Control”10
Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection10
Social Connectedness and Information Markets9
Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms9
Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment9
Disclosure in Markets for Ratings8
Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games8
An Information Theory of Efficient Differential Treatment8
What Should a Firm Know? Protecting Consumers’ Privacy Rents8
Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control8
Exit Dilemma: The Role of Private Learning on Firm Survival7
Keeping Up with “The Joneses”: Reference-Dependent Choice with Social Comparisons7
Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets7
Supervised Machine Learning for Eliciting Individual Demand7
Blind Disclosure7
A Theory of Monopolistic Competition with Horizontally Heterogeneous Consumers6
A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information6
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments6
Front Matter6
Judicial Mechanism Design6
Front Matter6
Intertemporal Altruism6
Production Clustering and Offshoring6
Sources of Limited Consideration and Market Power in E-Commerce6
Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination6
Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains6
Strategic Thinking Skills: A Key to Collective Economic Success6
Reference Dependence and Attribution Bias: Evidence from Real-Effort Experiments6
Searching Forever After5
A Random Reference Model5
Monitoring Teams5
Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs, and Data Portability5
Dynamic Privacy Choices5
Reputation and Efficiency: Information Design5
The Modern Wholesaler: Global Sourcing, Domestic Distribution, and Scale Economies5
Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination5
Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition5
Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching5
Front Matter5
Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems4
Coordination and Organization Design: Theory and Micro-Evidence4
Scoring Strategic Agents4
Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions4
Front Matter4
A New Era of Midnight Mergers: Antitrust Risk and Investor Disclosures4
A Theory of One-Size-Fits-All Recommendations4
The Dynamic Effects of Recycling on Oligopoly Competition: Evidence from the US Paper Industry4
At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? The Pros and Cons of Charismatic Leadership4
Stability of Experimental Results: Forecasts and Evidence4
Church Tax Exemption and Structure of Religious Markets: A Dynamic Structural Analysis4
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in China’s Movie Industry4
Trade-ins and Transaction Costs in the Market for Used Business Jets4
Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition4
The Inverse Product Differentiation Logit Model4
Optimal Contract Regulation in Selection Markets4
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